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Abstract
Trust is one the key concepts in analyzing the maintenance of social order and diversity in modern societies.
Previous studies have reported that trust correlates, for instance, with higher economic growth, better governance,
higher levels of education and subjective wellbeing. However, former Soviet countries face particular problems in
developing the habits of trust. These observations of trust call for a more comprehensive and in-depth areal research
on the concept.
The present thesis examines the dynamics of political trust in contemporary Russia, and draws inspiration from W.
Mishler and R. Rose’s (2001, 2005) studies of political trust. Mishler and Rose (2001) studied the origins of political
trust in post-Communist Eastern European countries in the late 1990s. Their main finding was that while socio-
demographic factors explain poorly the variance of political trust in post-Soviet sphere, the individual perceptions
of political and economic performance of the institutions correlate significantly with it. Thus, they advance that
political trust is a rational response to institutional performance in those countries. In this regard, political trust in
Eastern European countries seems to adhere to conditions of the Russian proverb “doverjaj, no proverjaj” (“trust
but verify”).
This thesis aims to examine how relevant the aforementioned argument is in the context of contemporary Russia.
This examination is done by conducting a kind of replicate analysis of Mishler and Rose’s model. Moreover, a
critical evaluation of the results of thesis’ model is given by applying recent insights from Russian studies. The data
for the thesis’  model are drawn from the third round of the Life in Transition survey (LiTS III).  Analyses were
performed using principal component factor analysis and ordinary least squares linear regression models.
In general, the results of the thesis’s model are consistent with those of Mishler and Rose (2001): the subjective
perceptions of political and economic performance of Russian institutions were the most significant domains
associated with political trust in modern Russia, whereas socio-demographic factors had only a minuscule effect in
shaping it. However, the hypothesis about political trust as a rational response to political and economic performance
contradicts with the recent data and research on Russian economy and politics: economy has stagnated or even
fallen in Russia during recent years, and, at the same time, Russian domestic policy has become increasingly
repressive. These observations suggest that political trust might be a reflection of something else than mere rational
response to institutional performance in Russia. On the other hand, the fluctuation of the Russian political trust
implies that it presents evaluative attitudes toward institutions, but in the light of the evidence of this thesis, the
level of rationality of these evaluative attitudes remains unclear and questionable.
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Tiivistelmä
Luottamus on yksi avainkäsitteistä analysoitaessa sitä, miten voidaan ylläpitää samanaikaisesti sosiaalista järjestystä
ja sosiaalista monimuotoisuutta nyky-yhteiskunnissa. Aiemmat tutkimukset ovat osoittaneet luottamuksen
korreloivan esimerkiksi korkeamman talouskasvun, hyvän hallinnon, korkeamman koulutustason sekä
subjektiivisen hyvinvoinnin kanssa. Luottamuksen rakentaminen on kuitenkin haastavaa, etenkin entisissä
neuvostomaissa. Nämä havainnot antavat aihetta kokonaisvaltaisemmalle ja syvällisemmälle alueelliselle
luottamuksen tutkimukselle.
Tämä pro gradu tutkielma tutkii poliittisen luottamuksen dynamiikkaa nyky-Venäjällä, ja tutkielman innoittajina
ovat W. Mishlerin ja R. Rosen (2001, 2005) tutkimukset. Mishler ja Rose (2001) tutkivat poliittisen luottamuksen
syntymiseen johtavia syitä Itä-Euroopan entisissä kommunistimaissa 1990-luvun lopulla. Heidän mukaansa
sosiodemografiset tekijät selittävät heikosti poliittisen luottamuksen vaihtelua jälkisosialistisissa maissa, kun taas
ihmisten subjektiiviset näkemykset instituutioiden poliittisesta ja taloudellisesta toiminnasta korreloivat
merkittävästi poliittisen luottamuksen kanssa. Tämän perusteella Mishler ja Rose päättelivät poliittisen
luottamuksen olevan rationaalinen reaktio instituutioiden harjoittamaa politiikkaa kohtaan Itä-Euroopan entisissä
neuvostomaissa. Tässä mielessä poliittinen luottamus näyttää mukailevan kyseisissä maissa venäläistä sanontaa
”doverjaj, no proverjaj” (”luota, mutta varmista”).
Tutkielmassa tarkastellaan, kuinka relevantti edellä mainittu argumentti on nyky-Venäjän kontekstissa.
Käytännössä tämä toteutetaan tekemällä eräänlainen toistokoe Mishlerin ja Rosen mallista, sekä analysoimalla
toistokokeen tuloksia kriittisesti viimeaikaisien Venäjä-tutkimuksen näkökulmien valossa. Tutkielman
analyyttisessä mallissa käytetään Life in Transition Surveyn tuoreimman kierroksen (LiTS III) dataa.
Analyysimenetelminä käytetään pääkomponenttianalyysiä sekä pienimmän neliösumman menetelmän regressiota.
Analyysimallien tulokset ovat yleisesti ottaen linjassa Mishlerin ja Rosen tulosten kanssa: Subjektiiviset
näkemykset venäläisten instituutioiden poliittisesta ja taloudellisesta toiminnasta olivat mallin mukaan kaikkein
merkittävimmin yhteydessä poliittiseen luottamukseen nyky-Venäjällä, kun taas sosiodemografisten tekijöiden
vaikutus oli vähäinen. Hypoteesi poliittisesta luottamuksesta rationaalisena reaktiona poliittiseen ja taloudelliseen
kehitykseen on kuitenkin ristiriidassa tuoreen Venäjän taloutta ja poliittista kehitystä koskevan datan ja tutkimuksen
kanssa, sillä Venäjän talous on ollut stagnaatiossa tai jopa laskenut viime vuosien aikana, ja samaan aikaan
sisäpolitiikassa vallanpitäjien otteet ovat kiristyneet. Tämä puolestaan viittaa siihen, että poliittinen luottamus
saattaa heijastella muutakin kuin rationaalista reaktiota instituutioiden toimintaa kohtaan Venäjällä. Poliittisen
luottamuksen vaihtelu ajan mittaan Venäjällä puolestaan kielii siitä, että poliittinen luottamus ilmentää ihmisten
arvioita instituutioiden harjoittamasta politiikasta, mutta tutkielmassa esitettyjen havaintojen valossa näiden
arvioiden täsmällisyys ja rationaalisuus on kuitenkin kyseenalaista.
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11 Introduction
“Pervoe pravilo: doverjaj, no proverjaj.” (“The first rule: trust, but verify.”)
Russian proverb from the second episode of the Soviet
 film Bol'shaja zhizn', 1946 (Dushenko, 2017)
“The contemporary model of the Russian state starts with trust and relies on
trust. This it its main distinction from the Western model, which cultivates
mistrust and criticism. And this is the source of its power.”
Vladislav Surkov (2019)
Trust is one the key concepts in analyzing the maintenance of social order and diversity
in modern societies. It is also one the crucial factors keeping modern, complex and
differentiated societies together. (Jokinen, 2002, p. 10.) People usually attach positive
features to trust. Indeed, since the early 1990s, a wide range of studies have demonstrated
that trust correlates, for instance, with such factors as higher growth rates of the national
economies, better governance, higher average levels of education and subjective
wellbeing (Bjørnskov, 2011; Coleman, 1988; Knack & Keefer, 1997; Uslaner, 2002; Zak
& Knack, 2001). Trust has also become one the key concepts in analyzing and
understanding contemporary world. B.A. Misztal (1996, pp. 2–3), for instance, has even
claimed that it is impossible to discuss modern societies without considering trust.
The importance of trust may be understood by the empirical observation that many of the
most developed and wealthiest countries today are also, generally speaking, more trusting
countries.  In  other  words,  evidence  suggests  that  there  is  a  link  between  trust  and
prosperous society. Figure 1 illustrates the trust ratings in selected European countries
according to European Social Survey (2012). As one may observe, countries with higher
levels of interpersonal and institutional trust are often the same countries that score high
in various other international rankings (see e.g. The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2005;
The Legatum Prosperity Index, 2018; UNDP, 2019; Veenhoven, 2014). For instance,
Scandinavian countries together with such Western European countries as Netherlands
and Germany are the most trusting countries, whereas former socialist countries of
Eastern Europe and some Southern European countries have considerably lower scores
in European trust rankings. Indeed, it has been previously observed that former Soviet
countries face particular problems in developing the habits of trust (Rothstein, 2004, p.
13).
2Figure 1: Trust in Europe
The unequal distribution of trust in Europe and internationally calls for a more
comprehensive and in-depth areal research on the concept. Why trust is so poorly
developed in the post-Soviet countries? What factors affect to the development of
political trust? Is there a way to bolster political trust, or is it mainly dependent on national
culture?
In this thesis, I will examine the dynamics of political trust in contemporary Russia. Since
trust is a subjective feeling which is often measured by standardized questions in large-
scale data surveys, I will examine the dynamics of political trust by using recent cross-
sectional survey data on Russia. I draw inspiration for my thesis from W. Mishler and R.
Rose’s (2001, 2005) hypothesis for the origins of political trust in post-Soviet sphere and
Russia. Their central argument is that individual perceptions of economic and political
performance of different institutions mainly explain the differences in the variance of
political trust in Russia, and post-Soviet sphere in general. In their study What are the
origins of political trust? Testing institutional and cultural theories in post-communist
societies (2001), Mishler and Rose tested the impact of different subjective political and
economic attitudes and demographic factors on trust in post-Soviet sphere. Their main
finding was that individual perceptions of economic and political performance of
different institutions is the main explanator of differecens in the variance of political trust,
whereas social and demographic background factors have little significance in shaping it.
In other words, institutions generate trust or distrust depending on their perceived
performance in the eyes of the public. Thus, according to them, trust in political
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3institutions in post-communist Eastern European countries is a rational response to
institutional performance. (ibid.) In their subsequent study, Mishler and Rose (2005)
examined trust with a similar research question, but only in Russian context. Although
the variables used in their later study were a bit different than those of their earlier study,
the main argument still holded up with single country analysis: individual perceptions of
public and economic policies were much more important for political trust than the socio-
demographic factors. In this regard, Mishler and Rose appear to suggest that political trust
in Russia sphere seems to adhere to conditions of the Russian proverb “doverjaj, no
proverjaj” (“trust but verify”).1
It is a widely held view that Russia is a low trust society (see e.g. Beljaeva, 2016;
Kozyreva & Smirnov, 2015; Mishler & Rose, 2001, 2005; Shlapentokh, 2006; Uslaner,
2008, pp. 726–727). However, empirical evidence suggests political trust to be somewhat
unequally distributed in Russia. Moreover, it has fluctuated notably in post-Soviet Russia
(Kozyreva & Smirnov, 2015). But what could constitute this variation and unequal
distribution of trust between different institutions? And what factors could account for
political trust in Russia? These are the main questions I strive to answer in this thesis.
In this thesis, I my aim is to examine how well Mishler and Rose’s (2001, 2005) argument
about the performance oriented nature of political trust applies today in contemporary
Russia. The analytical model of this thesis builds largely on Mishler and Rose’s earlier
study’s (2001) model for studying political trust in post-Soviet sphere. I decided on this
approach, because Mishler and Rose are prominent scholars in the field of Russian public
opinion studies, and their studies on trust in post-Communist countries are among their
best-known works. For example, the afore mentioned article on the origins of political
trust in ten Eastern European Post-Communist societies is their most cited article
according to Google Scholar. However, this study was conducted almost twenty years
ago, and hence I thought it would be interesting to see how valid their central argument
is today. Accordingly, albeit the analytical model for studying trust comes from Mishler
and Rose (2001), general features of Russian trust are theorized in this thesis more in
1 According to K. Dushenko (2017), this proverb originates from the second episode of the Soviet film “Big
Life” (Bol'shaja zhizn', 1946), but has been often attributed to Lenin in collections of aphorisms written in
English.
4detail from linguistic, cultural and sociological perspectives than in their work. Thus,
Russian area and cultural studies approach is also applied throughout the thesis.
It is hoped that this thesis could contribute to a deeper understanding of the relationship
of societal attitudes and political trust in Russia. This understanding is important, because
shedding light on these relationships can bring new insights in analyzing political trust in
Russian context. Accordingly, better understanding of the relationship between societal
factors and political trust can help us comprehend how it evolves in Russia. As mentioned
in the beginning of this chapter, trust is a crucial component keeping modern societies
together, and thus its more extensive comprehension is relevant for both the academia
and politicians.
1.1 Main concepts
The main concept discussed and examined in this thesis is trust, or, more accurately, its
sub-category political trust. Moreover, since many classic trust theories set interpersonal
trust as a precondition to political trust, it is also included into the analytical model of this
thesis.  Next,  I  will  preliminary  define  these  two  concepts.  More  comprehensive
discussion of the concepts may be found in the chapters 3 and 4.
Political trust measures perceived trust in political institutions. It is an evaluative
position toward government based on how well government is operating according to
people’s normative expectations (Hetherington, 1998, p. 791, 2018, p. 9). Retelling L.
Gudkov (2012, p. 20), political trust is a social interaction focused on a high probability
(changes) that the actions of partners (which can be also political institutions) will proceed
in accordance with the expectations given to them. Since trust can be measured by asking
directly from people themselves, trust in different political, economic and social
institutions is often used as an indicator of political trust. Political and institutional trust
are often used as synonyms (see e.g. Hetherington, 1998; Kozyreva & Smirnov, 2015;
Mishler & Rose, 2001), but to avoid confusion, I will utilize the concept of political trust
throughout the thesis.
Interpersonal trust measures trust in “other people”. Today, it is often operationalized
by standardized questions in large-scale data surveys. A typical question measuring
generalized trust in these surveys is formulated as: “Generally speaking, would you say
that most people can be trusted, or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people”.
5However, recent studies have questioned the validity of this classic trust question as
measure of generalized trust, and question about trust in “people one meets for the first
time” has been suggested to be used instead to measure the generalized trust in others
(Almakaeva et al., 2018, p. 932; Sturgis & Smith, 2010). Therefore, interpersonal trust is
measured by trust in “people one meets for the first” in this thesis. This concept is
discussed more in detain in the methodology chapter of the thesis.
1.2 The significance of the study
As mentioned, I aim to test the validity of Mishler and Rose’s (2001, 2005) hypothesis
on the origins political trust in Russia. This will be done by using more recent data and
contextualizing political trust. This is the first significance of the thesis. Another
significance of the thesis is that I will discuss problematics of studying trust particularly
in Russian context by combining cultural and area studies approach to their quantitative
approach.
In  summary,  one  could  say  that  the  significance  of  my  study  is  to  test  the  fitness  of
existing hypothesis on formation of political trust, and to bring new insights and ideas
into studying it particularly in Russia through extensive contextualization of the research
problems. This will be done by conducting a kind of replicate of Mishler and Rose’s
(2001) statistical analysis, and by contextualizing the results of this model in
contemporary Russian society.
Research questions
The main research question is how well Mishler and Rose’s (2001, 2005) hypothesis on
performance  oriented  nature  of  political  trust  holds  up  today  in  the  context  of
contemporary Russia. In this thesis, subjective political trust is measured by trust in
political institutions, and interpersonal trust by trust in “people you meet the first time”.
The question is how well different factors, such as demographic background, and
perceptions of economic and public policy predict one’s political and interpersonal trust
in Russia. To answer this question, an analytical model of measuring trust is created on
the basis of Mishler and Rose’s (2001) model. Apart from the main research question,
two specifying sub questions are also asked:
1. Do survey questions about trust measure the same thing in Russia than in
(Western) democracies?
62. Is it relevant to study political trust in such authoritarian countries as Russia by
utilizing theories that are developed to study it mainly in established democracies,
or  at  least  in  somewhat  different  kind  of  societies  than  Russia?  Or  is  the
composition of Russian political trust so unique that we need completely new kind
of theories to study it?
The first sub-question deals with the plausible cultural differences in the understandings
of trust. This question is discussed more in detail in the conceptualization chapter. The
second sub-question relates to the first. A narrative which especially the official Russia
likes  to  utilize  emphasizes  that  Russian  values  and  conception  of  the  world  differs
remarkably from the Western (Grigori Yudin, 2018). Following this logic, one could
argue that Russians might also use different criterions for evaluating the performance of
their country’s institutions than the westerners. Moreover, there are doubts that the
authoritarian polling environment may affect the way that people report their feelings in
survey answers (Kuran, 1997; Rogov, 2017). Thus, I will consider the possible limitations
of the cross-sectional data on Russia used in thesis in the limitations chapter.
1.3 Structure of thesis
This thesis consists of seven chapters: introduction, background, conceptualization of
trust, methodology, analysis and findings, limitations, and conclusions. The background
chapter deals with Mishler and Rose’s (2001) main arguments and theoretical concepts,
and introduces their approach to studying political trust in post-Soviet countries. The
concept of trust is further problematized in the conceptualization chapter. Accordingly,
since there are relevant historical differences between studying trust in democratic and
authoritarian countries, I will discuss why theories and models that stem from the Western
(or non-Russian) ideas of trust are utilized in this thesis instead of more localized theories
of  trust.  Hence,  the  conceptualization  chapter  includes  also  a  brief  history  of  Russian
sociological surveys. The Life in Transition Survey III, which serves as thesis’ data, and
the analysis method, ordinary least squares regression, are presented in the methodology
chapter. The analysis and findings chapter present the overall results of the statistical
models used in this thesis. Both the conceptual and methodological limitations of my
model for studying trust in Russia are examined in the limitations chapter. Finally, in the
conclusion  chapter,  I  will  discuss  how  well  research  questions  were  answered  and
introduce some thoughts on future research on subject.
72 Background
Trust is a major subject of interest within many different fields of science, and one of the
most basic and widely spread social categories (Rubtsova & Vasilieva, 2016, p. 61). It
has been the subject of many classic sociological studies dealing with the preconditions
of societal cohesion (Jokinen, 2002, p. 10). Importance and relevance of studying trust
may be illustrated by a simple database search: Google Scholar finds 922.000 and 382.000
results for “political trust Russia?” and “institutional trust Russia?”. Accordingly, similar
search on Russian digital library KiberLeninka finds 41.645 and 15.768 results for
”политическое доверие Россия” and “институциональное доверие Россия”. Thus,
since Mishler and Rose’s (2001) analytical model is utilized in this thesis, I will next
discuss their approaches to trust. Their main arguments and theoretical concepts are
introduced in this chapter to provide better understanding of where the analytical model
of the thesis’ stems from, and to clarify how trust is explored in this study.
2.1 Competing trust theories
Mishler and Rose (2001) identify two theoretical traditions as competing explanations for
the origins of trust: cultural and institutional theories. Cultural theories hypothesize that
the roots for political trust originate outside the political sphere in long-standing and
deeply seeded beliefs about other people, and these beliefs are rooted in cultural norms
and communicated through early-life socialization processes. Thus, political trust is as an
extension of interpersonal trust, learned early in life and later projected onto political
institutions. Hence, cultural theories hypothesize trust to be path dependent, which
indicates that the development of political trust will take decades or even generations.
(ibid, p. 33.)
Institutional theories, in contrast, argue trust in political institutions to be politically
exogenous. In other words, institutional trust is an excepted consequence of institutional
performance. To put it bluntly, institutions that perform well generate trust, and poorly
performing institutions generate distrust and skepticism. Thus, institutional theories
assume that political trust can be bolstered, for instance, by providing economic growth
and refraining from repressive and corrupt practices. (ibid., p. 32–33.) Mishler and Rose
(2001) suggest that competing theories of trust may be further divided into micro and
macro-level variants (Table 1).
8Table 1: Competing theories on the origins of political trust
Cultural and/or
Exogenous Theories
Institutional and/or
Endogenous Theories
Macro theories National culture Government performance
Micro theories Individual socialization Individual evaluations of performance
Competing theories of the origins of trust and their explanatory emphases, adopted
from Mishler and Rose (2001, p. 34).
As I am focusing solely on Russia instead of taking into account a wider group of
countries, I will concentrate on testing the micro-level variants of cultural and
institutional  theories  (the  lowest  row  in  Table  1),  which  emphasize  the  importance  of
individual socialization and individual evaluations of performance as main predictors in
the variance of political trust. Micro theories assume that political trust varies both within
and between societies as a result of political socialization experiences interrelated with
differences in educational background, gender, or other social structural influences and/or
because people have different political values and interests and thus they evaluate
political and economic performance differently. For example, two individuals living in
the same society and in the same kind of economic conditions may evaluate the economy
differently, because one puts greater emphasis on current household difficulties, whereas
the other does not stress current difficulties in expectation of future economic prosperity.
(Mishler & Rose, 2001, p. 49.) Mishler and Rose (2001, 2005, pp. 1–2) argue that
although there are important differences among both cultural and institutional theories,
the commonalities with the regard to the emphasis given to necessary conditions for the
generation of trust justifies their common treatment.
Next, I will give a short overview of some of the classic social studies and theories dealing
with trust. By no means this overview aims to be a comprehensive representation of all
theoretical approaches to trust, but rather representative examples of some the significant
and influential studies with different explanatory emphases on trust.
R. Putnam is arguably one of the most well-known scholars dealing with such concepts
as  “trust”  and  “social  capital”.  He  is  often  cited  alongside  with  J.S.  Coleman  and  P.
Bordieu as founding father and developer of the term “social capital” (Breuskin, 2012, p.
2; Kankainen, 2019a). Since trust is an important component of social capital, Putnam’s
9work is highly relevant in the area of trust studies. In his book Making Democracy Work:
Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (1993), Putman studies the causes of differences in
economic and societal development between Northern and Southern Italy. He argues that
Northern  Italy’s  dense  of  civil  society  is  the  main  explanation  of  its  greater  civic
involvement and economic prosperity, while the agrarian South Italy is less prosperous
in the terms of economy and democracy because of its lesser social capital (and thus,
lower levels of trust). In Putnam’s reasoning, trust is a component of social capital, which
helps make political institutions function because it spreads first into cooperation with
people in local civic associations and then eventually creates a nationwide network of
institutions necessary for the presentable government. (Mishler & Rose, 2001, p. 34;
Putnam, 1993.) His work draws inspiration from Tocquevillian2 approach, in which
society’s capability to produce social capital (and hence also trust) among its citizens is
par excellence determined by its long-term experience of social organization, which have
roots in historical and cultural experiences that can be traced back over very long periods.
G. Almond and S. Verba’s (1963) book The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and
Democracy in Five Nations, in turn, is a study of the political culture of democracy, and
the social structures and processes sustaining it. Although it does not utilize concepts
social  capital  or  trust  as  explicitly  as  Putnam’s Making Democracy Work, it is classic
work in the field of political science and an often cited study among studies dealing with
trust (see e.g. Breuskin, 2012; Kozyreva & Smirnov, 2015; Mishler & Rose, 2001, 2005).
Almond and Verba’s (1963) central argument is highly relevant for trust studies, because
they claim that interpersonal trust is an essential precondition for the formation of
associations, which, in turn, are necessary for guaranteeing the effective political
participation in any democratic system. Thus, following their reasoning, one could define
trust as an important building block in creating a civic culture. In this sense, Almond and
Verba attach great importance to interpersonal trust in creating subsequent political trust.
2 Alexis de Tocqueville was a French diplomat, political scientist and historian who lived in the 19th century.
One of his most famous works is Democracy in America (1991), where he argued that the strength of
American democracy builds on its citizens’ propensity to form civil associations which educate people on
cooperation, shape their public awareness and foster solidarity among their members. Eventually, this will
give rise to a civil society. (Breuskin, 2012, p. 2; Kankainen, 2019b.)
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R. Inglehart is a political scientist and arguably best known for his position as a director
of  the  World  Values  Survey  (henceforth  WVS).  In  his  book Modernization and
Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic and Political Change in 43 Societies (1997),
Inglehart argues that economic development and cultural and political changes go
together in coherent and somewhat predictable patterns. According to him, some
socioeconomic developments are more likely than others, and some societal changes are
foreseeable. For instance, once society commences industrialization, a multitude related
changes – such as erosion of traditional gender roles – are likely to appear as well. With
respect to trust, Inglehart (ibid., pp. 188–190) embraces the Tocqueville-Putnam
hypothesis on the importance voluntary associations with regard to successful functioning
of democratic institutions. Analyzing the data of WVS, he suggests that membership in
voluntary associations is strongly linked with stable democracy: societies with higher
rates of association membership are for more likely to be stable democracies than those
of low rates of membership. Therefore, following Mishler and Rose’s typology, Inglehart
may be classified as cultural theorist.
As mentioned, J.S. Coleman is often accounted as one of the first utilizers of the concept
“social  capital”.  Thus,  the  modern  understanding  of  social  capital  –  and  trust  as  its
component – stems very much from his work (Breuskin, 2012, p. 2). However, unlike
Putnam, Coleman emphasizes the significance of performance instead of culture in
shaping trust. In his book Foundations of Social Theory (1994), Coleman defines trust as
a relation where at minimum two parties, trustor and trustee, engage in commerce that
usually contains risks, because all parties aim to satisfy their interests. According to him,
people engage in trusting relations because this allows an action on the part of the trustee
that would have been otherwise impossible, and if trustee proves to be trustworthy, trustor
is better off than in the case of choosing not to trust. (Coleman, 1994, pp. 96–98) To quote
Coleman (p. 99): “A further analysis […] of cases involving decisions to place trust shows
that the elements confronting the potential trustor are nothing more or less than the
considerations a rational actor applies  in  deciding  whether  to  place  a  bet”  (emphasis
added). For Coleman (p. 98), the rationale for political trust is that by trusting political
institutions people can free more time for themselves, and thus turn their attention to other
life  matters.  Naturally,  this  presupposes  that  political  trust  is  well  placed.  If  the
evaluations on the trustworthiness of political institutions and actors is not well placed,
the political, social and military affairs in which they are interested may turn out less well
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than if they had paid attention to them. (ibid., p. 98.) In short, Coleman’s sees trust as a
result of calculative decision-making process. In this sense, Coleman’s trust perception is
close to rational economic man thinking, which is also characteristic to some neoclassical
economic theories.
M. Hetherington may also be named as one of the advocates of institutional trust theories.
In his article The Political Relevance of Political Trust (1998), Hetherington studies the
effects  of  political  trust  in  the  American  political  system  by  examining  two  cross-
sectional datasets of the National Election Study from 1988 and 1996. His study’s results
suggest that trust not only reflects evaluative orientations with political leaders, but
distrust by itself is also likely to be a powerful cause of the dissatisfaction. In other words,
political distrust affects both specific and diffuse political support and is also being
affected by them (ibid., p. 799). On the grounds of his analyses, Hetherington concludes
that the (American) political leaders can increase trust by conducting generally accepted
policy solutions.
P. Dasgupta (1988), in turn, considers trust as a commodity based on reputation, which
has to be acquired through behavior over time in well-understood circumstances. He
utilizes a game theory approach to underline the idea of importance of trust in repeated
social interactions (or in the game theory language, “repeated games”), and concludes
that people invest resources for building a reputation for honesty, because the short-term
gains of dishonest behavior are lesser than the long-term gains of acting honestly. Thus,
following Dasgupta’s logic, one may find rational grounds for acting trustworthily even
in those situations where its short-term payoff is negative. In this sense, his approach to
trust is somewhat similar to Coleman’s rational actor assumption.
According to Mishler and Rose (2001, 2005), institutional or endogenous theories offer
superior explanations for the origins of political trust. In summary, Mishler and Rose
(2001, p. 33) suggest that cultural theories hypothesize trust to be path dependent, which
indicates that the development of political trust will take decades or even generations,
whereas institutional theories hypothesize that political institutions can generate trust, for
instance, by providing economic growth and refraining from repressive and corrupt
practices. On the basis of their analyses, Mishler and Rose (2001, 2005) claim that
institutional theories – and especially its micro-level variants – are superior in explaining
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the origins of political trust in post-Soviet sphere and in Russia. Thus, they conclude that
political trust can be nurtured by conducting sound public and economic policy.
Mishler and Rose’s (2001, 2005) studies on political trust in post-communist societies
and Russia are somewhat seminal: sociology and public opinion studies were generally
speaking underdeveloped during the Soviet era in Russia (Levada, 2004, p. 158). This
may have affected the fact that the research of Russian political trust in the 1990s and
2000s was primarily descriptive in nature. Even today, many studies of political trust in
Russia contain only descriptive statistics instead of quantitative analysis of the
phenomenon. In this sense, Mishler and Rose’s (2001, 2005) quantitative studies have
been significant exceptions in studying Russian trust.
However, Mishler and Rose do not treat contextual or cultural factors in much detail, but
rather assume trust to be a somewhat universal concept and to have similar connotations
in different cultures. Thus, their approach to political trust is rather similar to those
approaches of the generalizing grand theories discussed in this chapter. Nevertheless,
albeit these kind of theories have their own important role in analyzing and
comprehending multifaceted concepts and phenomena, it is also important to consider
how different societal contexts affect to phenomena. Hence, I will discuss some relevant
historical, contextual and cultural questions related to studying political trust especially
in a Russian setting in the following chapter.
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3 Conceptualizing & situating trust
In this part, I will discuss the concept of trust more in detail. Trust is a major of interest
within many different fields of science. As mentioned, the generality and importance of
the concept has supplied a massive amount on literature on the subject. Thus, in order to
have  a  coherent  and  reasonable  research  setting  for  the  thesis,  I  will  next  discuss  the
concepts of political and interpersonal trust more in detail. The theoretical foundations of
Mishler and Rose’s and the thesis analytical model for studying political trust were
discussed  in  the  previous  chapter.  This  chapter,  in  contrast,  offers  reflection  of  the
plausible cultural dependency of trust – that is, whether Russian understanding of trust
differs from the Western,  and why, in the final analysis,  Mishler and Rose’s analytical
prototype is used as a model for the analytical model of thesis’.
3.1 Cultural understandings of trust
As mentioned, Mishler and Rose (2001, 2005) suggest that institutional and economic
performance explains and predicts the best the volume of political trust in Russia. In their
article What are the origins of political trust (2001), they utilized trust in “people who
one meets” to measure interpersonal trust in all of the countries included in the analysis.
Political trust, in turn, was measured by mean score of individual trust in six institutions.
(ibid., pp. 42–44, 58.) However, in their study, they did not treat the possibility of
different cultural or linguistic understandings of trust in much detail. Nevertheless, since
I am concentrating solely on Russia in my thesis, it is relevant to consider whether the
Russian understanding of trust differs essentially from the Western understanding of it. It
is noteworthy that Mishler and Rose’s analytical model stems largely from theories that
are not developed to analyze particularly post-Soviet or Russian trust. This, in turn, raises
a following concern: could trust reflect different phenomena and have different
connotations in Russia than in the West?
The existing body of research on trust suggests that it is a highly complex and contested
concept, which also raises concerns about the possible culture dependency of trust. B.
Fine (2001), for instance, claims trust and other dimensions of social capital to be to a
large extent context dependent concepts. Thus, international survey questions on trust
likewise measure somewhat different phenomena in different countries. T. and M.
Yamagishi (1994) also argue that the trust data from different societies may be distorted
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by other types of societal perceptions or individual dispositions. T.W. Guinnane (2005,
p. 78), in turn, has criticized the loose use of trust in social sciences and economics, and
claimed that such a use has made trust a nearly useless concept.
Apart from possible culture and context dependencies of trust, some scholars have also
established that not only positive, but also negative connotations can be attached to it. For
example, K. Ilmonen and K. Jokinen (2002, p. 21) note that trusting relationships can be
either moral or amoral by their nature. They may produce solidarity, social cohesion and
economic growth, but also foster exploitation, intolerance and formation of antagonistic
groups within society. Organized crime and especially mafia is a good example of
“misuse” of trust, because, in its own way, mafia represents a network of abundant social
capital and trusting relationships. S. Berman (1997) has also stressed how the extensive
system of voluntary organizations in Germany after the First World War markedly eased
the Nazi takeover of power, which likewise can be seen as an example of evil-intentioned
use of social capital and trusting relationships.
Moreover,  when political  trust  is  considered, it  is  also important to remember that in a
democratic society political trust cannot be permanently all-resistant and unlimited.
Instead, occurrence of certain distrust in those in power is also one of the key features of
democratic society. (Kozyreva & Smirnov, 2015, p. 82.) P.M. Kozyreva and A.I. Smirnov
(2015, p. 87) suggest that both the “deficit” and “surplus” of political trust hinders
democracy.  Significant  deficit  of  political  trust  limits  the  possibilities  of  authorities  to
implement policies and reduces the activity of citizens, impedes the development of
integrational  processes  of  society,  and  slows  down  the  initiation  and  realization  of
constructive  plans.  Excessive  trust  in  governmental  authorities,  in  turn,  gives  them
unlimited power of agency, which easily leads to despotism and eventually to the
consolidation of authoritarian rule. Thus, Kozyreva and Smirnov argue that in order to
promote the development of democratic processes, the level political trust should not
reach either extremities. (ibid.)
Nonetheless, although afore mentioned observations of the “misuse” or negative
connotations of trust are highly important, many of them represent rather questions of
particularized in-group trust than those of generalized or political trust. As mentioned,
this thesis deals before all with the latter forms of trust. Thus, important and relevant as
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these notions on negative connotations are, I claim that they form insufficient grounds for
rejecting the idea general importance and desirability of trust.
However, this does not conclude the debate on universality–context-dependency of trust.
For instance, P. Watier and I. Marková (2004, p. 30) claim that one can find a double
distinction of trust when it is examined as a part of social differentiation process. First
distinction is between trust as a generalized belief and trust as a contextual confidence,
and the second distinction is between trust in other people and trust in abstract
mechanisms and institutions. G. Simmel (1992), for instance, distinguishes between the
contextual confidence, which rests on experience or on synthetic knowledge of the other
person, and between a more universal trust that is closer to a faith in a religious sense.
Above described differences in meanings of trust appear also in different human
languages. The French language, for example, differentiates between “to confide” (se
confier) and “to trust” (faire/avoir confiance). The first refers to an act of confidence in a
situation or in relation to certain characteristics of a person, while the latter, “to trust”,
refers to a non-context dependent confidence, which is beyond possible verification and
available knowledge; it is an act of faith in the strongest sense. The English language, in
turn, utilizes “trust” with reference to persons, whereas “confidence” refers to more often
to impersonal, professed and institutional relations of certainty with respect to expertness.
(Watier & Marková, 2004, p. 31.) On the other hand, according to Oxford Living
Dictionaries (https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/trust), trust is “firm belief in
the reliability, truth, or ability of someone or something” (emphasis added), so unlike
Watier and Marková (ibid.) claim, this modern dictionary definition presents that the
object of trust does not necessarily have to be a person.
Since I am dealing with Russia in this thesis, it is meaningful to consider the definitions
of Russian word for trust, doveriye. Table 2 provides summary of definitions of
“doveriye” and its uses. Dictionary definition of Russian trust described in Table 2
suggest that one can presume trust to indicate evaluations of normative beliefs in different
actors, and that these actors can be either individuals or larger groups of people, such as
organizations or institutions. Thus, by linguistic definition, Russian trust seems to by and
large represent the same kind of evaluative attitude or emotion towards someone or
something, as described in the introduction chapter of the thesis.
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Table 2: Definitions of trust (doveriye) in selected Russian monolingual dictionaries
Reference Definition Example of use
Kuznecov (1998)
“Relationship to someone,
based on assurance of his
honesty, his bona fides.”
– “To express trust (in
government, cabinet
etc.)”
– “To approve the work
of government,
cabinet etc.”
Dal' (2017)
”A feeling or conviction that
some person, circumstance
or hope can be trusted,
believed; faith in the
reliability of someone or
something.”
– “To authorize
somebody to do
something.”
– “To rely on someone,
to believe him, not to
doubt his honesty.”
– ”To believe, to entrust
someone.”
Ozhegov (2014)
”Confidence in someone’s
conscientiousness, sincerity,
in rightness of something.” – ”To gain or lose trust.”
Ushakov (2008)
“Assurance of someone’s
honesty, decency; faith in
someone’s sincerity and
decency.”
– ”To abuse, to lose
trust.”
– “Blind trust.”
– “To worm one's way
into somebody’s
confidence.”
Accordingly, a corpus linguistic analysis by Rubtsova and Vasilieva (2016) indicates that
the word trust is most commonly mentioned with “political institution”, “social
interaction” and ”economic institution” in the Russian mass media, which also in a certain
way supports the usability of trust as proxy for measuring political performance in Russia.
In spite of the linguistic similarities between the English and Russian definitions of trust,
some scholars have argued that the sociological understanding of Russian trust differs
substantially from the Western. For instance, famous Russian sociologist Y. Levada
(2004, pp. 158–159) points out that trust comparisons between the Western countries and
Russia cannot ever be exact, because in diverse social traditions people attach different
meanings to the term “trust”, and expect specific things when they say that they trust or
distrust  someone.  Levada  goes  on  by  claiming  that  if  Russian  citizen,  for  example,  is
17
asked whether he or she trusts the president, he does not conceive the institution of the
presidency as having any definite social duty, function or workplace. Instead, for Russian
citizen the institution of the presidency means above all  the particular person (e.g.  Mr.
Medvedev, Mr. Putin), that is, trust in the presidency is rather person than performance
oriented. Thus, while in the Western countries citizens expect from the president a proper
performance of official duties, in Russia people expect “miracles of salvation and heroic
feats”, as Levada writes. According to Levada, this same logic applies also to some extent
to other institutions, such as prime minister or governors. (ibid., p. 159.)
V. Shlapentokh (2006, p. 167) has made similar notions considering the expressions of
trust in the presidency in Russia. He suggests that evaluations of any country’s leader
tend to have a “Teflon” quality, which means that to some extent leader of the country is
immune to harsh criticisms for his or her failures in domestic and foreign policy.
Accordingly, the evaluations of the leader’s performance tend to be significantly higher
than the estimates of his or her activity in any individual sphere of society. The leader is
first of all seen as a representative of the general unity and stability of the country, and
thus his or her existence alone is considered a blessing to society. According to
Shlapentokh, this is especially the case in Russian society, which is fraught with various
“destructive tendencies”. Thus, the idea of disappearance of Putin is frightening for the
majority of Russians, and therefore they also avoid blaming him personally for the various
shortcomings in the country, preferring to blame other institutions instead. Shlapentokh
suggests that this tendency was illustrated clearly by Russians’ perceptions on the
responsibility for the tragedies at the Moscow Theater in 2002 and Beslan in 2004. (ibid.,
p. 167.)
L. Gudkov (2012, pp. 11–12) has also stressed the distinctive features of Russian trust.
According to him, one specific characteristic of trust in Russia is that low trust in others
is compensated with high trust in symbolically important institutions. Especially
president, army and Russian Orthodox Church have important symbolic meaning in
Russian society. Thus, following Gudkov’s logic, one could argue that expressing distrust
in these institutions in Russia has deeper meaning than mere declaration of dissatisfaction
of their actions. In other words, expressing distrust in these institutions would also mean
rejection of the important core values of Russian society. Hence, social threshold for
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expressing distrust in these three institutions may be higher than with other societal
institutions in Russia.
Gudkov (2012, pp. 12–13) goes on by arguing that traces of “totalitarian syndrome” can
be  seen  in  the  current  expressions  of  political  trust  in  Russia.  C.  Friedrich  and  Z.
Brzezinski (1956, p. 21) originally defined totalitarian syndrome as a “totalitarian
dictatorship consisting of an ideology, a single party typically led by one man, a terroristic
police, a communications monopoly, a weapons monopoly, and a centrally directed
economy”. Gudkov claims that in the Soviet era the legitimacy of communist rule was
based on confidence of masses in “the better future”, which meant quite modest but yet
guaranteed improvements in everyday life of the Soviet citizens. However, the economic
and social crisis of the 1990s Russia ruined this illusion for the better future, and thus the
post-Soviet  Russian  regimes  have  to  rely  its  legitimacy  on  reassurance  of  lack  of
alternative politics. This policy, in turn, is mainly supported by power structures and
propaganda. Gudkov contends the composition of aforementioned totalitarian trust to be
very stable, and thus distribution of opinions in Russia does not depend on interests of
different groups of society, but reflects deeper layer of mass ideas, which react poorly on
actual changes. (Gudkov, 2012, pp. 12–13.)
The existing data on Russian trust do not directly contradict Levada’s, Shlapentkoh’s and
Gudkov’s  claims.  Table  3  shows  an  overview  of  the  distribution  of  trust  in  different
institutions and other people in Russia. As the table illustrates, the armed forces and
president are clearly the most trusted institutions. Over 70% of Russians express rather
trusting than neutral or distrusting relations with these two institutions. Government,
police and religious institutions are also more likely trusted than distrusted. In general,
however, Russia can be described as low-trust society where distrust and skepticism are
widespread: nine of the fourteen institutions presented in Table 3 are trusted by less than
one third of Russians. It is noteworthy in Table 3 that trust in religious institutions is lower
and trust in police higher than in many other surveys and opinion polls (see e.g. Gudkov,
2012; Kozyreva & Smirnov, 2015; Levada-tsentr, 2018a; VTsIOM, 2018a). In general,
however, the data of multiple different surveys and polls asking about trust in Russia paint
a similar picture of the phenomenon as presented in Table 3.
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Table 3: Dynamics of institutional and interpersonal trust in Russia
Trusting
(%)
Neutral
(%)
Distrusting
(%)
Mean
Armed forces 73 15 12 3,99
Presidency 72 13 14 3,88
Government 43 26 32 3,08
Police 41 25 34 3,02
Religious institutions 38 28 34 3,01
Regional government 31 29 40 2,82
Local government 28 26 46 2,69
Courts 28 31 41 2,78
Parliament 26 32 42 2,74
Banks and the financial system 25 27 47 2,67
Other people 21 26 53 2,45
Political parties 20 31 49 2,54
Trade unions 20 35 45 2,61
Foreign investors 13 30 57 2,32
Non-governmental organizations 12 33 55 2,34
Institutional trust (average) 26 45 29 2,93
Source: Life in Transition III survey, EBRD 2016.
Questions: “To what extent do you trust the following institutions” and “To what extent do you trust
people you meet the first time”. The total number of weighted responses for each institution varies
from 1257 to 1468. Means are based on a 5-point scale, on which trusting = 4–5 on trust; neutral = 3 on
trust; and distrusting 1–2 on trust.
3.2 Why to study Russian trust using grand theories?
As the previous chapter illustrates, Mishler and Rose build their model of analyzing
political trust mainly on general ideas and grand theories that have been developed to
analyze trust primarily in the Western, or at least in non-Russian context. Nevertheless,
as mentioned above, some scholars suggest that the Russian cultural understanding of
trust differs somewhat from Western. Thus, one could also question the use of these grand
theory based and “non-Russian” models for studying political trust in Russia. All the
classic trust theorists mentioned in the previous chapter of the thesis have developed their
analytical model to analyze contexts that differ substantially from contemporary Russian
context. Putnam (1993), for instance, studies trust in Italy, Almond and Verba (1963) in
Britain, the United States, Germany, Italy and Mexico, and Hetherington (1998) deals
with political trust in America. Coleman’s and Dasgupta’s contributions, in turn, are
rather theoretical than empirical. Out these advocates of cultural and institutional theories,
Inglehart is the only one who examines also Russia as a part of his cross-country analyses.
This raises a logical question: why to use those analytical models and ideas of studying
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political trust that have not been developed to study it particularly in Russia? Since I am
utilizing survey data to study Russian political trust, it is relevant to briefly consider the
general historical differences of studying public opinion in Russia and in the more
democratic countries to answer this question.
The U.S. has been a leading country in the development of modern survey methods
(Simpura & Melkas, 2013, p. 35). Modern opinion polls and surveys have been an
important part of social sciences at least since the 1930s, when G. Gallup, A. Crossley
and E. Roper successfully predicted the re-election of Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1936 by
using random sampling method. These correct predictions were also an important
milestone in beginning of era of modern technologies for studying public opinion, and
they also shaped the ulterior political culture of the U.S. (Doktorov, 2004, p. 19.)
Prominent Russian sociologist B. Doktorov (2004) has examined the differences between
the development of Russian (or Soviet) and the U.S. public opinion studies. According to
him, the development of survey methods in the U.S. since the 1930s was a direct result
of country’s political and economic system, because the capitalistic and democratic
societal system of the U.S. was dependent on gaining information about the interests and
intentions of consumers and voters. However, this was not the case with Russia during
the Soviet era, because democratic elections did not exist, and market economy was
replaced with command economy. Thus, there was not demand such a demand for public
opinion research, as in the political system of the U.S. (ibid., p. 19.)
However, this not to say that surveys were totally non-existent in the Soviet Union. The
first professional organization for studying public opinion in the Soviet Union, “Institute
of public opinion of ‘Komsomol'skaja pravda’”, or “IOM ‘KP’” (Institut
obshhestvennogo mnenija “KP”), was founded in 1960, and famous Russian sociologist
B. Grushin was appointed to head the organization. (Doktorov 2004, p. 11.) Nevertheless,
since the state was to replace all markets as the means of distributing resources, the
government control of information was a distinctive feature of communist rule. For
instance, economy had to be monitored carefully in order to determine what should be
produced. Accordingly, since the Soviet regime was based on force rather than popular
will, it had to keep an eye on society and observe vigilantly for signs of opposition and
resistance.  (Herrera,  2006,  p.  54.)  In  this  sense,  surveys  and  state  statistics  served
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primarily as “the eyes” of the establishment rather than as source of information for the
public.
There were several reasons for the Soviet establishment to prohibit opinion surveys. First,
they could have exposed the deficits of the Soviet society or public discontent with the
system. Secondly, they might have also caused disadvantageous comparisons with the
West, which would have been importunate for the ruling power. Accordingly, social
sciences were generally underdeveloped in the Soviet Union, because the Soviet rulers
strived to control all the information. Ruling power also distorted the development of
civic society with the Kremlin led propaganda, and repressed science community for
decades. The most symbolic example of this act against the science community was
Lenin’s order to deport two hundred or more intellectuals – doctors, economists,
philosophers, and others – abroad on what became known as “the Philosophers’ Ship”.
(Gessen, 2017, pp. 18–19.) Thus, both the domestic (Soviet) and foreign scholars willing
to examine the country had to base their conclusions on scattered knowledge and “phrase
them in a language inadequate for the task”, as M. Gessen (2017, p. 18) has put it.
In short, the degree of freedom of conducting opinion surveys in Russia was largely
dependent on the leaders of the Communist party during the Soviet era. As mentioned,
Lenin started the supervision and repression of the Russian science community, and
situation did not become any easier for social scientists after Stalin took the power and
started  his  Great  Terror.  IOM  KP,  in  turn,  was  founded  in  the  course  of  the  years  of
Hrushhjov’s Thaw, while its activities became increasingly regulated – and was
eventually shut down – during Brezhnev’s rule. (Doktorov 2004, pp. 12–13.) The first
polling institute of modern Russia, VTsIOM (Russian Public Opinion Research Center),
was founded during the era of Gorbachjov’s perestroika and glasnost only in 1987
(VTsIOM, 2018b), when it became increasingly possible to criticize and publicly discuss
the defects of the Soviet society. As a first sociological institution in Russia, VTsIOM
was a pioneer for many sociological surveys and it build a reputation as an independent
research organization in the course of the 1990s (VTsIOM, 2019b). However, a few years
after Vladimir Putin came into power, the Kremlin tightened its grip over various societal
institutions, and VTsIOM was no exception here: in 2003, the Ministry of Property of the
Russian Federation decided to change the status of the center, making it a 100% state
owned institution. As a result, the then director of VTsIOM, Y. Levada and his collective
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left the center to create their own analytical organization, which later became known as
the Levada-Center (Levada-tsentr, 2018b). Later in 2016, the Kremlin further hampered
the functioning of the Center by giving it a status of “foreign-agent” (Levada-tsentr,
2016).
This brief historical overview of the evolution of Russian public opinion research
indicates that the development of sociological surveys in the 20th century Russia differs
substantially from the Western. In the ideal world, statistics (including opinion surveys)
are publicly produced commons, which are then utilized to make the everyday decision-
making processes easier (Simpura & Melkas, 2013, p. 15). Nevertheless, both the Soviet
and post-Soviet Russian experience illustrates that this has not been the case in Russia.
On the contrary, the degree of freedom for conducting opinion surveys has been, and, to
some  extent,  continues  to  be  dependent  on  the  attitudes  of  the  Russian  rulers.
Accordingly, this has undermined the development of public opinion research in Russia,
which, in turn, could partly explain why there has been little quantitative analysis of
Russian political trust.
Thus, although the analytical model of this thesis is adopted from Mishler and Rose –
who built their model largely on theories developed to analyze different type of societies
than Russia – it offers a good starting point for a study. Moreover, in spite of the
roughness of Mishler and Rose’s (2001) analytical model, it includes many relevant
measures, and, on the other hand, ignores some factors that are probably relevant in
examining  political  trust  in  many  democratic  countries,  but  not  in  Russia  (such  as
membership in voluntary organizations or labor unions, see methodology chapter of the
thesis for discussion of this topic). However, since the purpose of the current thesis is also
to situate trust studies to Russia, it is necessary to acknowledge the impact of cultural,
linguistic and sociological contexts in analyzing the results.
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4 Methodology
In this chapter, I will introduce the data for the analysis and the analysis method of thesis.
Since my analytical model comes from Mishler and Rose’s (2001) work, I will utilize
ordinary  least  squares  (henceforth  OLS)  regression  analysis  as  they  did  to  test  their
hypothesis  on  origins  of  trust  in  Russia.  In  this  thesis,  the  aim  is  to  examine  how
independent variables (socialization and social background, and political and economic
performance perceptions) predict dependent variables (political and interpersonal trust),
and compare the outcomes of Mishler and Rose’s (ibid.) model and thesis’ model. Next,
I will introduce the data and then the method.
4.1 In search of the most fit data for my analysis – Life in Transition Survey
The data  that  Mishler  and  Rose  used  in  their  analysis  were  drawn from the  fifth  New
Democracies Barometer (henceforth NDB) and the seventh New Russia Barometer
(henceforth NRB). Interviews for both NDB and NRB were conducted in 1998 (for
further details of these surveys go to http://www.cspp.strath.ac.uk/index.html). NRB
survey measured trust in institutions by asking the respondents the following question:
“There are many different institutions in this country, for example, the government,
courts, police, civil servants. Please show me on this 7-point scale, where 1 represents
great distrust and 7 represents great trust, how much is your personal trust in each of the
following institutions.” The list of institutions included political parties, courts, police,
civil servants, government, the military, parliament, churches, trade unions, television
and  radio,  the  press,  private  enterprise  and  the  president  of  the  country.  Interpersonal
trust, in turn, was measured by asking people “How much do you trust most people you
meet?” with the same response set. (Mishler & Rose 2001, p. 40.)
According to Mishler and Rose (2001, pp. 40–41) a significant theoretical advantage of
this kind of question formulation is that trust in institutions is asked without reference to
the performance of institutions or their occupants. Some surveys use question
formulation, which asks respondents to measure “confidence” in establishment
democratic institutions by asking in particular about “the people running government”
and whether institutions are “doing what is right”. However, Mishler and Rose claim that
this kind of questions bias responses in ways that favor performance-oriented theories of
trust. They also cited the use of the same metric in measuring interpersonal and
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institutional trust as an advantage of their data, because the use of different metric might
cause confusion and affect the survey responds. (ibid., p. 41.)
Since my analytical model comes from Mishler and Rose (2001), I had to examine which
kind data would fit my purposes the best. At first, I considered using data of Social
Distinctions in Modern Russia (henceforth SDMR), which has been carried out in Russia
in 1991, 1998, 2006 and 2015. This survey is conducted by the Russian Academy of
Sciences institution (State Humanities University) in concert with the University of
Helsinki and the University of Tampere. SDMR is a large-N survey covering a wide range
of areas of Russian society, such as class composition, income divisions, family and social
mobility, values, interests and stereotypes. Nevertheless, it does not cover questions on
political and economic performance, or on perceived corruption similar to Mishler and
Rose’s (ibid.) model. Thus, I did not consider the data of SDMR very suitable for my
model.
Another survey which I considered to be useful for my “replicate analysis” was the
European Social Survey’s (henceforth ESS) data on Russia. ESS asks many questions on
trust similar to NRB’s trust measures. It is a longitudinal large-N survey, which has been
conducted in Russia in 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012 and 2016. However, as with SDMR, ESS
does not cover questions on perceived corruption, and questions on political and
economic  performance  that  could  be  possibly  used  in  my  analysis  were  also  quite
different from Mishler and Rose’s (2001, p. 58) model. Furthermore, from the usability
perspective,  survey  questions  on  institutional  trust  in  ESS  cover  some  quite  irrelevant
institutions to my analysis. It asks, for instance, respondents to report their trust in the
European Parliament and in the United Nations, but not about trust in the armed forces,
president and churches – which are usually cited as the most trusted institutions in Russia
according to various different opinion surveys. The absence of these relevant institutions
would naturally affect the overall analysis and its conclusions. Thus, despite of the
comprehensive sample size and advantages of longitudinal data analysis, ESS was not the
most suitable resource for my analysis.
Finally, I came across with the Life in Transition survey (henceforth LiTS) carried out by
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (henceforth EBRD). LiTS has been
conducted three times, in 2006, 2010 and 2016. As the name of the survey indicates, LiTS
deals with transition countries, that is, with former command economies adopting market
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economy practices, including Russia. It is a combined household and attitudinal survey
which collects information on the socio-economic status of the respondents and asks
subjective, perception-based questions on economic, political and social topics. The latest
round of the survey (LiTS III) covered 51,000 households in 29 transition countries as
well as Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Greece and two Western European comparator
countries (Germany and Italy). The third round included many similar features to the first
two rounds, but it has larger coverage of interviews, with 1,500 households interviewed
in each country instead of the 1,000 households of the previous rounds.
The LiTS III interviews were conducted with a female and a male respondent in all
households composed of at least two adult members of a different gender. The survey
was conducted face-to-face by means of Computer-assisted Personal Interviewing
(CAPI). (EBRD, 2016, pp. 7–8, 67.) The LiTS III was designed by means of multi-stage
random probability stratified clustered sampling, and the sample was stratified by
geographical region and level of urbanity. 75 primary sampling units were selected in
each  country  in  the  first  stage  of  sampling.  In  order  to  build  a  panel  element  into  the
survey, interviewers were requested to revisit the localities that were sampled during the
second round of the survey in 2010. (EBRD, 2016, p. 68.)
I use the data of the third round of the LiTS (III) for my analysis, because it has relatively
comprehensive sampling (N for Russia is 1,507) and its questions are quite similar to ones
Mishler and Rose (2001) utilized in their model. The LiTS III was conducted between the
end of 2015 and the beginning of 2016. The country data on Russia includes nine
modules, of which the first two collect information on the characteristics of the household,
the dwelling they live in and their consumption habits. The remaining modules gather
information on asset ownership, working profile, entrepreneurial activities, attitudes and
perceptions of corruption of the primary respondent. Especially the latter data on attitudes
and individual perceptions on economic and politics is highly relevant to my model.
Hence, I decided to use the LiTS III data in my analysis.
Another advantage of the LiTS III is that it is open access data. The complete survey data,
including all three waves, is openly available on request for research purposes
(https://www.ebrd.com/publications/life-in-transition-iii). The LiTS III was designed by
the EBRD’s Office of the Chief Economist, Transparency International and the World
Bank’s Poverty and Equity Global Practice.  The survey was funded by the EBRD
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Sharefolder Special Fund, Transparency International and World Bank’s Umbrella
Facility for Gender Equality. From an ethical viewpoint, the findings of the LiTS III will
not identify individuals or families, and all the information obtained from the survey will
be used only in the aggregated form. Thus, neither users of the LiTS III data – including
me – nor the people who read the analysis of this thesis, can identify a single participant
of the survey.
4.2 Analytical model
In this section, I will introduce the statistical method of the analysis. The analysis method
depends on the nature of the data and the research question. I chose to use OLS regression
as statistical method for my analysis. I decided on this method, because my intention is
to imitate the analysis of the origins of political trust by Mishler and Rose (2001), and
hence it is reasonable to use the same statistical method as they did, that is, OLS. Since
the dependent variables (institutional and interpersonal trust) are and some of the
independent variables are ordinal, one could argue that different kind of regression
models should have been utilized instead of linear models. However, besides the fact that
political trust is technically speaking categorized as ordinal variable in my data, it is not
completely groundless to assume it to behave like continuous variable. Moreover,
although my model is a little bit rough around the edges, it nevertheless describes the
phenomenon of political trust without systematic error. In addition to this, the advantage
of linear models is that they have more straightforward interpretation (Almakaeva et al.,
2018).
In  Mishler  and  Rose’s  (2001)  study  of  the  dynamics  of  trust  in  post-Soviet  countries,
altogether eight regression analyses were run in order to define which factors have the
most effect on political and interpersonal trust. Their model has three separate domains:
socialization domain, and political and economic performance domains. The socialization
domain is operationalized by using five variables concerning social and demographic
aspects that might affect individual’s perceptions on trust: age, education, gender, town
size and church attendance. Political performance domain, in turn, contains aggregate
index of political corruption and individual perceptions of personal freedom, government
fairness, political corruption and government responsiveness to citizen influence. Lastly,
economic performance domain includes individual evaluations of both current and
prospective evaluations of macro-economy and household economy, perceptions on the
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importance of fighting inflation versus fighting unemployment, and subjective
experiences of unemployment and respondent’s income quartile. (ibid., pp. 49–51.)
As mentioned in the previous chapter, many classic studies emphasize the importance of
civil society in making of political trust. Therefore, one could argue that measures civil
society activity should be added to socialization domain. However, there are compelling
counterarguments to oppose this view. For instance, Kozyreva and Smirnov (2015, pp.
95–96) have noted that the Russian civil society is weakly developed, and many Russians
do not consider the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to promote their rights or
interests  efficiently.  Much  in  the  same  way,  the  labor  unions  do  not  have  the  same
significance  in  promoting  worker’s  rights  and  interests  as  in  Western  democracies,
because the Russian labor unions are weak and dependent on federal and regional
authorities,  and  they  also  have  weak ties  with  other  organizations  of  the  Russian  civil
society.  (ibid.)  Thus,  it  is  reasonable  to  exclude  these  civil  society  measures  from  the
thesis’ model too.
As described earlier, the measures used in this thesis are derived from the LiTS III.
Unfortunately, since I use cross-sectional data of one single country in my statistical
model, aggregate data of the Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index
cannot be utilized, like Mishler and Rose did in their cross-country model. However, I do
not cite this to be very serious limitation considering the entire analysis, given the fact
their model includes only one aggregate variable (the data on aggregate corruption of
afore mentioned Corruption Perceptions Index). In addition to this, experience of
unemployment could not be included in my analysis due too many missing values (965
missing cases or 64% of responds to a question “Are you actively looking for a job at this
moment”, which was the closest question to measure experience of unemployment in the
LiTS III dataset).
Since I utilize the analytic model of Mishler and Rose’s (2001) study, I conducted a
principal components analysis similar to their study to make out a better understanding
of what kind of variables could be used to build summed scales on institutional trust (see
Table 4). This analysis produced three components with eigenvalues greater than 1.0,
which is often cited as a limit value for the main components to be included in further
analysis (Jokivuori & Hietala, 2007, p. 98). However, the first component dominates with
the eigenvalue of 7.2, and, also accounts more than 33% of the total variance in the 14
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Table 4: Dimensions of political trust in Russia
Rotated Component Matrixa
Variable
Component
1 2 3
Regional government ,839 ,281 ,178
Parliament ,838 ,313 ,161
Government ,815 ,144 ,314
Local government ,804 ,340 ,127
Political parties ,779 ,344
Courts ,681 ,421 ,105
Foreign investors ,216 ,838
NGO's ,313 ,790
Banks and the financial system ,234 ,679 ,318
Trade unions ,378 ,604 ,131
Religious institutions ,369 ,405 ,273
Armed forces ,129 ,892
Presidency ,572 ,620
Police ,144 ,551 ,584
Eigenvalue 7,209 1,373 1,186
Percentage of variance 33,065 23,107 13,602
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.
a. Rotation converged in 7 iterations.
measures of institutional trust. Apart from this, the institutions with factor loadings
greater than 0.5 in the first component are democratic institutions – no matter how
undemocratic they might be in reality. Thus, it is also reasonable to assume that when
survey respondents evaluate the political performance of different institutions, they
evaluate the performance of public institutions rather than the performance of private
sector, civil society or institutions practicing monopoly on violence. For example, it
would be illogical to assume that Russians would consider military responsible for
economic policy and economic growth or fighting the corruption in the country; this task
is rather given to democratic institutions with higher factor loadings of the first
component. Moreover, a recent study by E. Sirotkina and M. Zavadskaya (forthcoming
in 2019) suggests that Russians do differentiate political institutions from each other when
evaluating their functionality and performance.
Although political trust is the main interest of the thesis, many classic trust theories
hypothesize interpersonal trust as a precondition for political trust. Thus, interpersonal
29
trust is also included in the thesis model as a dependent variable, and it is measured by
the LiTS III question “to what extent do you trust people you meet for the first time”.
Phrasing of a question differs somewhat from the one Mishler and Rose utilized (“trust
in people who you meet”). The LiTS III also includes the classic trust question “Generally
speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can’t be too careful
in dealing with people”, but the validity of this as measure of generalized trust has been
questioned recently. For instance, Sturgis and Smith (2010) discovered in their study that
in the UK over 40% of people answering the question whether “other people” can be
trusted or not actually had family, friends and colleagues – in other words, known people
– in mind when thinking of “other people”. Accordingly, various scholars have detected
significant  variation  of  the  trust  radius  across  countries  (Delhey  et  al.,  2014;  Torpe  &
Lolle, 2011; van Hoorn, 2014). Thus, it has been suggested that this radius of trust in the
classic question indicates particularized trust instead of generalized trust (Almakaeva et
al., 2018, p. 932). Moreover, the classic trust question has been criticized also for its two-
dimensionality, since the first part of the question captures trust, but the second one
addresses caution instead of distrust. However, trust and caution are not opposites and
mutually exclusive, and they can exist simultaneously. Considering the encountered
criticism of the classic trust question, I will use a measure of generalized trust that is free
from the trust radius and trust-caution issues. Trust in “people one meets for the first time”
question offers such measure, because it presupposes trust in people regardless of the
specifics of their otherness. (ibid., p. 932.)
Furthermore, since the mass media is considered as an important source of public opinion
(Noelle-Neumann, 1986, pp. 157–166; Rogov, 2017), I added one variable in my model
to measure the impact of media consumption on political trust. There are reasons to
assume that media consumption could have impact on political trust, because majority of
Russians uses TV as the main source of information. (Levada-tsentr, 2017). At the same
time, the Russian media scene has also undergone significant changes in Putin’s era, and
the Kremlin has strived to restore state’s control over the media contents (Strovsky, 2015).
Thus, the Kremlin has the means to mold the public attitudes in its favor, and hence one
could assume the news consumption to correlate with higher levels of political trust. In
my model, media consumption is measured with a question on how often respondent uses
news broadcasts on radio or TV to learn what is going on in Russia or in the world.
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Table 5 provides a more detailed comparison of Mishler and Rose’s (2001) and the thesis
model’s variables. In sum, variables used in Mishler & Rose’s analysis but not in my
model are: aggregate corruption, perceived government fairness, prospective macro and
household economy and experience of unemployment.
Table 5: Comparison of the measures of Mishler & Rose’s and the thesis’ model
Variable Mishler and Rose’s model Thesis’ model
Trust in political
institutions
Individual trust in parties,
parliament, president and/or prime
minister, courts, police, military.
Individual trust in parliament, regional
government, local government, political
parties, government, courts, presidency.
Trust in people Trust in people “who you meet.” Trust in “people you meet the first time”.
Education Level of education on 4-point scale. Level of education on 2-point scale.
Age Age in years. Age in years
Gender Female or male. Female or male.
Town size Town size on 4-point scale. Urbanity / rurality status.
Church attendance Frequency of church attendance. Not available, religious group used as a
proxy.
Perceived
corruption
Corruption increased or decreased
since Communism.
Overall corruption decreased in 4 years or
not.
Perceived
freedoms
Freedom of speech, religion,
association and political interest have
increased since Communism.
Mean score of individual perceptions of
existing freedoms and rights in Russia.
Perceived
influence
Government’s responsiveness to
citizen influence worsened or
improved since Communism.
Children who are born now will have a
better life than my generation.
Current macro-
economy
Satisfaction or dissatisfaction with
macro-economic system in 5 years.
Overall satisfaction with the present state
of the economy.
Current household
economy
Information missing.3 Overall satisfaction with the present
personal financial situation as a whole.
Retrospective
household
economy
Household finances better or worse
under communism.
Household lives better than 4 years ago.
Income quartile Subjective placing on income
quartile.
Subjective placing on income percentile
ladder.
News consumption – How often respondent uses newsbroadcasts as a source of information.
3Unfortunately, information on this variable was missing in Mishler and Rose’s (2001) appendix, so the
original measure remains unknown to me. However, question about personal financial situation in the LiTS
III seemed like a good proxy to measure individual satisfaction on current household economy.
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However, one extra variable was added to my model to measure how news consumption
affects political trust. The existing measures of my model are the closest proxies to
Mishler and Rose’s model variables I could find in the LiTS III.
5 Analysis and findings
This chapter provides the results of my analysis. To recap, my intention is to test whether
Mishler and Rose’s (2001) hypothesis on the origins of political trust applies to
contemporary Russia. In their study, Mishler and Rose ran several OLS regressions to
test what kind of factors correlate with political and interpersonal trust. On the basis of
their model, they claim that institutional trust theories are many times better in explaining
the  variance  of  trust  in  post-Soviet  sphere.  This  lead  them  to  conclude  that  there  is  a
distinction between interpersonal and political trust in post-Soviet societies, and because
of this, political trust is substantially determined by institutional performance. (ibid., pp.
50, 55–58.)
Table 6 summarizes the main findings of my model. All analyses were carried out using
SPSS software’s (version 25) linear regression function. In general, my model confirms
the hypothesis of Mishler and Rose: perceptions of political and economic situation in the
country explain better the differences in trust than the socio-demographic factors.
Religion and educational level are the only factors that associate with political and
interpersonal trust, when all the other variables are controlled: the Orthodox Christians
have more trusting relations with political institutions than other religious groups, and
Russians with higher education trust slightly less other people than their countrymen with
high school or lower education. The strong correlation between the Orthodoxy and
political trust is not surprising, given its position as a dominant religion and its close ties
with  the  Russian  political  life  (Lamoreaux  &  Flake,  2018).  However,  together  the  six
socialization variables explain only 1.2% of the variance in political trust and 0.6% in
interpersonal trust, respectively.
The political performance domain, in contrast, accounts 28.5% of the total variance in
political trust and 7.1% in interpersonal trust. The strongest predictor of this domain for
both political and interpersonal trust is the extent of perceived freedoms in Russia. Those
Russians who believe that certain democratic rights and freedoms exist in their country
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also express more trust in institutions and other people, than their more cynical
compatriots. Moreover, agreement with statement that “children who are born now will
have a better life than my generation” increases moderately but statistically significantly
trust in political institutions. Much in the same way, the perception of decreased
corruption in Russia bolsters trust in others.
Table 6: OLS estimates on sources of political and interpersonal trust in Russia
Political trust Interpersonal trust
Variable B S.E. Beta B S.E. Beta
Socialization and social
structure
Educational level .004 .048 .002 -.133 .067 -.057**
Age .000 .001 .003 .001 .002 .016
Gender .049 .046 .025 .126 .064 .054
Urbanity status .041 .056 .018 .029 .077 .010
Religion .262 .069 .092*** -.076 .095 -.022
News consumption .009 .020 .011 -.011 .027 -.011
Adjusted R2 bloc (total) 1.2% 0.6%
Political performance
perceptions
Perceived corruption .033 .027 .035 .084 .037 .075**
Perceived freedoms .443 .031 .373*** .143 .043 .102**
Perceived influence .070 .022 .082** .054 .030 .053
Adjusted R2 bloc (total) 28.5% 7.1%
Economic performance
perceptions
Current macro-economic .238 .029 .238*** .217 .040 .185***
Current household economy .065 .027 .074** .134 .038 .128***
Retrospective household
economy
.015 .027 .016 -.079 .037 -.073**
Income percentile -.035 .012 -.076** -.067 .016 -.123***
Adjusted R2 bloc (total) 19.3% 9.2%
Total adjusted R2 34.7% 11.5%
N 1241 1224
Note: The Bs and Betas reported in the table are those for the fully specified model; the R2,
however, is reported separately for each bloc of variables as well as cumulatively for the
model as a whole.
***p<.001
**p<.05
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Finally,  the  economic  performance  domain  explains  19.3% of  the  variance  in  political
trust and 11.5% in trust in other people. The observation of Mishler and Rose (2001, p.
52) about the importance of macro-economy for trust holds up in my model as well –
macro-economic conditions have strong and significant effects on trust. Current macro-
economic evaluation (“On the whole, I am satisfied with the present state of the
economy”) is the strongest explanatory variable for interpersonal trust and the second
strongest for political trust.
Satisfaction with one’s household’s economic situation and level of income have also
significant effects in shaping trust, especially in the case of interpersonal trust.
Satisfaction with own financial situation increases trust in other people, and, accordingly,
those who feel that they belong to a lower income group tend to be more skeptical towards
others. These two variables have similar but weaker effects on political trust too.
Moreover, Russians who disagree that their household lives better than four years ago
report lower trust in other people.
By and large, my updated and explicitly “Russian” model supports the main findings of
Mishler and Rose (2001). There are some minor differences, for instance, according to
their  model,  age  and  town  size  of  the  socialization  domain  were  the  most  significant
factors in shaping trust in institutions instead of religion. However, it is important to bear
in mind that the variables used in my model and in theirs differ from each other,
sometimes even quite substantially. Hence, the way in which variables interact with each
other within regression equation naturally differs too. Moreover, my model deals only
with Russia, whereas Mishler and Rose’s cross-country model includes nine other post-
Soviet countries as well. Nonetheless, both analyses maintain that perceptions of political
and economic conditions have stronger influence on both political and interpersonal trust
in Russia, than the socio-demographic background.
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6 Limitations of my model
Studying  political  trust  is  challenging  for  many  reasons.  Since  trust  is  to  some  extent
culture and context dependent concept, it is difficult to give generally acceptable
definition to it. Moreover, it is hard to prove causality between different factors and
perceptions of trust on the basis of my model: how can we, for instance, know whether
those Russians satisfied with the macro-economy are more trusting or trusting Russians
more satisfied with the economy? In other words, does economic optimism bolster
political trust or political trust economic optimism?
In this chapter, I will consider the conceptual and methodological limitations of my
model. Conceptual limitations consist of the different cultural understandings of some
independent variables of my model. Much in the same way as trust reflects a set of values,
perceptions on political and economic performance may reflect cultural differences. For
instance, Russians might stress different aspects of democracy and market economy in
their evaluations than westerners. Since my model utilizes only subjective political and
economic performance evaluations, it is reasonable to examine how well these
evaluations go together with the more objective data on similar issues on the given time
period, that is in 2015–2016 Russia. The methodological limitations, in contrast, deal with
limitations concerning the data, i.e. the LiTS III, especially the plausible effects that
authoritarian survey environment may have on the survey answers. These limitations are
reviewed in following.
6.1 Conceptual limitations
I discussed the possibility of distinctiveness of Russian trust in the third chapter of this
thesis. However, since my model utilizes subjective evaluations and perceptions to
measure the successfulness of public and economic policy, one could also ask whether
the  democratic  and  economic  preferences  of  Russians  differ  significantly  from  the
preferences of the citizens of democratic countries. For example, my model points out
that those Russians who are more prone to believe that free and fair elections, law and
order, freedom of speech, peace and stability, a state independent press, a strong political
opposition, fair courts system and equal rights for women exist in Russia also report
higher levels of political and interpersonal trust. But how Russians actually perceive and
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stress these democratic values and freedoms? Do Russians consider these values as
important as westerners in the first place?
A considerable amount of both academic and popular literature have been published on
rising authoritarianism and conservatism in Putin’s Russia. Very often this literature
suggests that the first decade of the 2000’s was a decade of  “softer” authoritarianism,
which took more repressive and total form after the pro-democratic protests in 2011–
2012. Especially the annexation of Crimea and the subsequent confrontation with the
West is seen often as an important demarcation point. (Gel’man, 2015; Kniivilä, 2014;
Rogov, 2014, 2016.) Apart from growing repression, the Russian state leadership has
increasingly emphasized traditional and conservative values as core of the Russian
national unity, particularly after Putin’s return to the presidency in 2012 (Østbø, 2017;
Robinson, 2017). Moreover, state ideology in Putin’s Russia has been influenced by ideas
of fundamental differences between Russian and Western values. Here, the Russian
establishment has been inspired by so called Eurasian mode of thinking, which
underscores  Russia’s  role  in  the  creation  of  Eurasian  civilization  (Bassin  et  al.,  2015).
Scholars have described the change in Russian political atmosphere after 2012 with such
terms as “ideological”, “cultural” and “conservative turn” (Engström, 2014; Laine &
Saarelainen, 2017; Robinson, 2017).
In addition to “cultural turn” and growing repression in the 2010’s Russia, the Kremlin
has emphasized differences between Russian and Western models of democracy. For
instance, former deputy chief of the Russian Presidential Administration and Russian
Federation’s  deputy  prime  minister  V.  Surkov  has  claimed  that  Russian  democratic
system is not democracy in a Western sense, but a system of “sovereign democracy”.
Surkov  (2006)  defines  sovereign  democracy  as  “a  society's  political  life  where  the
political powers, their authorities and decisions are decided and controlled by a diverse
Russian nation for the purpose of reaching material welfare, freedom and fairness by all
citizens, social groups and nationalities, by the people that formed it”. Critics have
purported that in practice sovereign democracy means that the Kremlin can define
whether democratic exigencies are realized or not in Russia. Moreover, critics claim that
sovereign democracy makes the Russian government by definition immune for the
critique of foreign governments and human rights organizations. (Lipman, 2006; van
Herpen, 2015, p. 80.)
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Aforementioned “turns” and the concept of sovereign democracy in Russian politics begs
the  question  about  the  possible  change  in  the  views  of  ordinary  Russians.  It  has  been
previously observed that Russians actually had high expectations for market economy
and democracy in the beginning of the 1990s, when the Soviet Union collapsed (Shiraev
& Zubok, 2000, pp. 41–43; Yudin, 2017). However, these expectations were not met:
Russia’s economy suffered from two hyperinflations in the course of the 1990s, and a low
birthrate combined with a low life expectancy led to a severe population decline and
demographic crisis (Kainu et al., 2017; Stiglitz, 2002, pp. 133–165). Could it be so that
majority of Russians have abandoned the Western democratic ideals after disillusionment
with the Russian democracy of the 1990s, and embraced “Russian values” or “sovereign
democracy” instead, as some Kremlin-minded thinkers have claimed in recent years?
Answering this question is challenging, because the available data and research on the
subject offers somewhat conflicting results. On the one hand, there are representative
surveys and studies pointing out that out of all transition countries, Russians have the
most negative attitudes towards the free market and democracy. A study of Denisova et
al. (2010), for instance, maintain that about one-half of Russian population is
disappointed with transition from communism to capitalism. At the same time, a large
majority  of  Russians  favors  high  state  regulation,  and  state  provision  of  goods  and
services.  The  data  of  the  LiTS  III  paints  a  somewhat  similar  picture  of  Russian
disappointment with democracy and market economy. According to the LiTS III data,
36% and 46% of Russians think that an authoritarian system or planned economy,
respectively, could be preferable under some circumstances to democracy and market
economy. These two figures are the highest in the whole transition region. In addition to
this, 83% of Russians opted for “Country A” when they were asked the subsequent
hypothetical question:
“Imagine you could choose between living in two countries, Country A and
Country B. Country A has few political liberties but strong economic growth.
Country B has full political liberties but weak economic growth. Which country
would you rather live in?” (EBRD, 2016, p. 120.)
Nevertheless,  another  response  figures  of  the  LiTS  III  data  suggest  that  despite  of
aforementioned recent authoritarian tendencies, an overwhelming majority of Russians
considers  Western  type  democratic  rights  and  freedoms  important  for  their  homeland.
Table 7 provides figures of Russian perceptions on the importance of certain democratic
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institutions and freedoms for their country. The data suggests that in spite of the Kremlin
promoted Russian model of democracy, Russians seem to still embrace (Western)
democratic values. Therefore, one could also claim that it is reasonable to use them as an
independent variable in a model examining Russian trust, as has been done in this thesis.
On the other hand, it is noteworthy that even though the large majority of Russians cite
democratic institutions and freedoms important, the most important factors are peace and
stability, and law and order, while a bit over a third of the respondents do not perceive
independent press and strong political opposition very important for Russia.
Table 7: Perceived importance of democratic institutions & freedoms in Russia
Agree
(%)
Neutral
(%)
Disagree
(%)
Mean
Peace and stability 92 5 3 4,3
Law and order 92 5 3 4,3
Fair courts system 92 6 3 4,3
Free and fair elections 88 9 3 4,2
Freedom of speech 87 9 4 4,1
Equal rights for women 85 11 4 4,1
Independent press 76 17 7 3,9
Strong political opposition 72 20 9 3,9
Source: LiTS III, EBRD 2016.
Question: “To what extent do you agree that the following are important for Russia? The total number
of weighted responses varies from 1437 to 1482. Means are based on a 5-point scale, on which agree =
4–5; neutral = 3; and disagree = 1–2.
Moreover, the mere descriptive LiTS III data on the importance democratic rights and
freedoms does not end the debate on possible different cultural understandings of
democracy: according to multi-continental representative surveys, perceptions of
democratic governance and preferability of democracy have weak connections with the
actual stage of democracy in different countries. Rose et al. (2011, pp. 22–26), for
instance, discovered that despite of the fact that most part of the mankind does not live in
democratic countries, there is a near universal support for democracy. However, the fact
whether a regime actually is democratic or not has no influence on how its population
evaluates its performance: some governments of undemocratic countries are highly
supported by their population, while some governments of the most democratic countries
have poor performance evaluations. (ibid., pp. 24–26.)
A quick glance at the cross-country data also suggests that there is no connection between
perceived democratic governance and the actual governance politics. Figure 2 presents
an overview of weighted mean scores for each country for the WVS question: “How
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Source: World Values Survey, 2010–2014, wave 6 (Inglehart et al., 2014). Political status: Freedom
house rating as reported for year of survey (www.freedomhouse.org). Idea for the figure is adopted
from Rose et al. (2011, p. 25).
Question: “How democratically is this country being governed today?” Means are based on a 10-
point scale, on which “not at all democratic” = 1 and “completely democratic” = 10.
democratically is your country being governed today?”, and, respectively, each country’s
categorization according to Freedom House’s Freedom in the World index. As the figure
illustrates, evaluations of the current level of democratic varies substantially between
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Figure 2: Perceived level of democracy in different regimes
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different societies, but it does not depend on the “actual level of democracy”. Populations
of some undemocratic and authoritarian countries nonetheless perceive that their
countries are governed quite democratically, whereas populations of some established
democracies give somewhat negative evaluations of their country’s democratic
governance. For instance, citizens of arguably undemocratic Rwanda, Kazakhstan, Jordan
and China express positive evaluations of their regime’s level of democratic governance,
while allegedly more democratic Estonians, Romanians and Slovenians are more
skeptical of their regime’s democratic governance.
As far as Russia is concerned, Russians seem to give quite “realistic” evaluations of their
regime’s way of governance according to this dataset: Freedom House labels Russia as
undemocratic country, and Russians are also one the most skeptical nations in their
attitudes towards democratic governance of their homeland with the mean score of 4.6 on
a 10-point-scale. However, the picture changes slightly when people are asked what
definitions they give to democracy. As  H. Kirsch and C. Welzel (2018) pointed out in
their study, not only widespread support for democracy but also the endorsement of both
liberal and authoritarian notions of democracy coexist in many countries. This is
especially true in non-Western cultures (see also: Shin, 2015). This observation seems to
hold up also with Russia.
Figure 3 provides comparison of mean support for authoritarian notions of democracy.
As closer inspection of the figure shows, Russia is positioned rather in the same group
with other undemocratic countries than in the group of established democracies. The
mean score for the support of authoritarian notions of democracy in Russia is 5.2, which
is also higher than the world average (4.9).4
In summary, one cannot exclude the possibility of different understandings of Russian
and Western democracy on the basis of the existing data: on average, Russians seem to
be more supportive to authoritarian ideas of democracy than westerners. Thus,
theoretically speaking, the possibility that the correlation between democratic rights and
4 In their study, Kirsch and Welzel (2018) defined authoritarian notions of democracy as three meanings of
democracy which attribute unchecked powers to (1) “religious authorities”, (2) “the army” and (3) the
statement that people’s obedience to their rulers is essential for democracy.
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Source: Inglehart et al. (2014)
Note: Russia emphasized with red font color.
Question: “Many things are desirable, but not all of them are essential characteristics of
democracy. Please tell me for each of the following things how essential you think it is as a
characteristic of democracy: 1) ‘Religious authorities ultimately interpret laws’, 2) ‘The army
takes over when government is incompetent’ and 3) ‘People obey their rulers’”. Means are based
on a 10-point scale, on which “not essential to democracy” = 1 and “essential to democracy” = 10.
freedoms and political and interpersonal trust found in my model would erode if
authoritarian were asked (and included in the model) cannot be completely ruled out.
Unfortunately, the LiTS III does not include such measures.
Another concern is about the reliability of the subjective economic evaluations. Both
Mishler and Rose and the thesis’ model suggest that satisfaction with the macro-economic
system increases political trust. On the strength of this result, Mishler and Rose (2001,
pp. 56–58) concluded that political trust can be generated in the post-Soviet sphere by
conducting acceptable economic policies. Thus, following Coleman’s (1994, p. 99) logic,
they conceive political trust as a rational response to conducted public and economic
policies (emphasis added). Henceforth, this view is referred to as the rational response
approach in this thesis.
However, the objective data on Russian macro-economy from the time period when LiTS
III was conducted contradicts the rational response approach. Figure 4 presents IMF’s
(2018) data on the development of selected macro-economic indicators in Russia in 2000–
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Figure 4: Selected macro-economic indicators in Russia in 2000–2017
2017. As the chart indicates, many economic indicators have either stagnated or fallen
in recent years in Russia. For example, GDP growth sunk steadily from 2011 to 2015,
the inflation rate nearly doubled in 2014–2015 and GDP per capita in 2015–2016 was
lesser than in 2014.
In a certain way, the rational response approach resembles the idea of human as a naïve
scientist. According to S.T. Fiske and S.E. Taylor (1991, pp. 11–12), the naïve scientist
approach hypothesizes that given enough time, humans gather all the relevant data and
arrive at the most logical conclusion when measuring and analyzing the world around
them.
The  key  problem  with  this  explanation  is  that  it  makes  somewhat  generalizing
assumptions about the cognitive inclinations and limitations of the human mind. It has
been previously observed that people take shortcuts in interpreting causal relationships
and in estimating magnitudes, frequencies and probabilities. In the same way, people
employ several mental shortcuts and judgmental heuristics in evaluating and inferring
different phenomena. One of these heuristics is about availability: people are prone to
estimate frequencies and probabilities by the ease with which instances or associations
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come to mind. An individual might, for instance, estimate the proportion of philatelists in
the society by recalling the philatelists among one’s own acquaintances. The significance
of the heuristic lies in the link it creates between repetition and perceived validity – the
exposure to a particular view eases its retrieval from memory and thus increases its
perceived validity. (Kahneman, 2011, pp. 7–9; Kuran, 1997, pp. 158–159; 166.) S.T.
Fiske and S.E. Taylor (1991, p. 13) utilize the concept of “cognitive miser” to depict the
idea that because people are limited in their capacity to process information, they employ
shortcuts whenever they can.
Previous research has established that the concept of heuristics stems from two basic
principles of human judgment. The first principle of human judgement is often referred
as the “least effort principle”, which presumes that individuals do not often have complete
information when they make social judgements and evaluations. The least effort principle
rests on the assumption that individuals prefer to spend as little cognitive effort as possible
when processing information in a judgement situation. However, the least effort principle
is not the only mover in decision-making and evaluative situations, but people are also
prone to make decisions and judgements that are reasonably accurate. This latter
judgement principle, in turn, is often referred as the “sufficiency principle”, which
assumes that a desire to make accurate or “good” decisions motivates people to expend
the amount of effort necessary to reach a sufficient amount of confidence in the quality
of their decision. (Chen & Chaiken, 1999, pp. 74–75; Rudolph, 2017, p. 198.)
Taken together, the least effort and sufficiency principles form the heuristic-systematic
model of information processing (Chaiken, 1980). According to this model, there are two
different modes of information processing – systematic and heuristic processing – which
differ mainly in terms of how effortfully people process information in the decision-
making or judgment situation. Systematic processing is more analytical and takes more
effort, whereas heuristic processing is less effortful mode of thinking, and requires much
less cognitive effort. T. Rudolph (2017, p. 198) maintains that since individuals generally
prefer less effortful forms of information processing, it is widely assumed that people will
also prefer to engage in heuristic processing rather than in systematic processing,
whenever it is possible for them.
Accordingly, P.M. Sniderman et al. (1991, pp. 18–19) argue that several lines of evidence
suggest that the average citizen knows little about politics and political abstractions.
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Consequently, this political knowledge gap is compensated by taking advantage of
judgmental heuristics. Sniderman et al (ibid.) define heuristics as “judgemental shortcuts,
efficient ways to organize and simplify political choices, efficient in the double sense of
requiring relatively little information to execute, yet yielding dependable answers even to
complex problems of choice”. Russian scholars A.V. Beljanin and V.P. Zinchenko (2010,
p. 45) have made similar notions concerning political trust in Russia by arguing that
“political trust is often groundless, spontaneous and even irrational”.
In sum, afore mentioned notions on the cognitive limitations and people’s propensity for
heuristic reasoning take issue with rational response approach. The possible impact of
spontaneous or heuristic evaluations concerning the political and economic factors of my
model cannot be completely ruled out. Accordingly, they may offer a possible alternative
explanation for my model’s results.
6.2 Methodological limitations
Mishler and Rose (2001, 2005) hypothesize political trust to be performance oriented by
nature in Russia (and in post-Soviet sphere in general). In short, well-performing
institutions generate trust, and poorly performing institutions generate skepticism and
distrust. While my “replicate measurement” does not contradict with their model, their
conclusions make somewhat generalizing assumptions on human rationality, as already
mentioned before. Another problem with their conclusion is that it does not consider how
the surrounding society can affect opinion formation. Human is a “social animal”, and
thus derives both emotional and physical comfort from the other members of the
community and from the surrounding society: people feel themselves isolated and
vulnerable without approval of their communities, and people gain access to otherwise
inaccessible goods and services through participation in the social system (Kuran 1997,
pp. 26–27). The early psychological experiments – such as the Asch (1963) experiment
and the Milgram (1974) experiment on obedience to authority figures – have
demonstrated the considerable power of group pressure on individual choice and fear of
social criticism.
Fear of group criticism and social consequences for expressing generally unacceptable
views are especially relevant concerns in present-day Russia, because regime has become
increasingly repressive after Putin took office in the beginning of the 21th century, as
discussed in the beginning of this chapter. Especially the annexation of the Crimean
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peninsula in the spring 2014 marked an important turning point in the post-Soviet Russian
history, because it provoked a major crisis in Russia-West relations, and quick repressive
reaction in Russian domestic policy (Rogov, 2014).
Moreover, there are doubts that survey respondents might falsify their preferences. This
concern is especially relevant in authoritarian countries, where freedom of speech and
political rights are more limited than in democracies (Kuran, 1997; Rogov, 2017). T.
Kuran (1997) employs the concept of preference falsification to describe the situation
where people’s expressed public preferences differ from their private preferences.
According to Kuran, preference falsification aims at manipulating the perceptions of
others about one’s motivations or dispositions. It is a broader concept than mere “self-
censorship”, because unlike self-censorship, which silences one’s potentially
blameworthy thoughts, preference falsification goes beyond that by expressing
deliberately projected contrived opinion. It also causes unease and discomfort to the
falsifier.  Preference  falsification  is  a  response  to  real  or  imagined  social  pressures
attached to a particular preference. (ibid., pp. 4–5.)
Kuran (1997) argues that preference falsification contributed to the longevity of the
Soviet Union, because Soviet citizens falsified their private preferences partly to gain
material benefits, and partly for fear of punishment for expressing one’s private
preferences. This falsification of public preferences lead to reinforcement of the
perception that society is at least publicly behind the establishment, which, in turn, raised
the political threshold of protesting. Kuran also suggests that such political surprises as
revolutions will occur more likely in the future in politically repressing countries than in
established democracies, because doubts about the regime are expressed relatively freely
in countries with strong democratic traditions. Countries with weak democratic traditions,
in contrast, harshly limit our ability to track popular causes for complaint against the
political regime. (ibid., pp. 345.)
Afore mentioned Kuran’s (ibid.) observations raise the question about the possible
preference falsification in my data. Could the recent ascent of Russian authoritarianism
have led to a situation, where survey respondents increasingly engage in preference
falsification, and thus distorted the data used in my model? In other words, does my data
reflect the general and sincere attitudes of Russian citizens? Preference falsification
causes a nibbling doubt that the survey data gets inflated in such authoritarian countries
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as Russia, because respondents are not honest to pollsters. Even a small change of
punishment, or perceived social or political repression may be sufficient to persuade
survey respondents from expressing their true feelings about the establishment or politics
in general in authoritarian regimes. (Frye et al., 2017, pp. 1–2; Rogov, 2017.)
Accordingly, some scholars have argued that Russian pollsters and survey organizations
are often seen as servants of the authoritarian regime, and thus survey respondents often
give socially desirable responses in surveys (Belkovskij, 2016, pp. 28–29).
Answering the question about the possible preference falsification is not completely
straightforward, and it is beyond the scope of the thesis to examine in detail whether or
not this phenomenon exists in the data used in my analysis. Nonetheless, some
considerations could be expressed here. First, there are persuasive arguments pointing out
that self-censorship is relatively limited in Russian surveys. As T. Frye et al. (2017, p. 5)
stress, security service and intelligence agency’s monitoring in today’s Russia is not as
penetrating as it was in the Soviet era, and it is uncommon to observe cases were charges
are brought against ordinary citizens for merely expressing oppositional views. The harsh
repression for expressing public criticism of the establishment concerns mainly
opposition elites and politicians, but usually not politically inactive average Russians.
(ibid.) Frye et al. (2017) also tested the occurrence of preference falsification in V. Putin’s
approval ratings in 2015 using list experiments5, and found no systematic bias in
president’s favor.
Furthermore, if the data used in my model would be significantly biased in favor of the
Kremlin’s political ideology, one could expect to observe systematic tendency towards
approval of the Kremlin’s politics in the survey responds. Yet, Russians seem to give
quite critical evaluations of Russian domestic politics. Table 8 shows the breakdown of
evaluative the political and economic performance variables used in my model. It can be
seen from the data in Table 8 that an overwhelming majority of the respondents are very
skeptical and critical of the overall economic situation. Likewise, most of the Russians
do not believe that the overall corruption has decreased. The issue of perceived freedoms
polarizes public opinion the most in my data: fourth of the respondents perceive that
5 A list experiment is a questionnaire design technique used to mitigate respondent social desirability bias
when eliciting information about sensitive topics (World Bank, 2019).
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fundamental political rights exist in contemporary Russia, while almost as many disagrees
with this statement,  and half  of the respondents take neutral  position to this statement.
The only statement with which majority of the respondents are more optimistic than
pessimistic about is that future generations will have a better life than their generation.
Table 8: Public evaluations of political & economic situation in Russia
Agree
(%)
Neutral
(%)
Disagree
(%)
Current macro-economy (macro-economy has improved) 12 16 72
Perceived corruption (corruption has decreased) 13 21 66
Retrospective household (household lives better than before) 15 23 62
Current household economy (satisfaction with the household economy) 19 23 57
Perceived freedoms (basic political rights and freedoms exist in Russia) 26 50 25
Perceived influence (future generations will have a better life) 41 29 30
Source: LiTS III, EBRD 2016
Note: N varies from 1396 to 1480. See the appendix for the complete versions of question
wordings.
On the other hand, survey data on freedom of speech in Russia suggests that there is a
sizeable minority of Russians who feel that they cannot always speak freely about their
opinions on the Kremlin’s policymaking. In 2012–2017, on average 42% of Russians felt
they face either some or serious limitations to their freedom of speech, and 18% thought
that the majority of Russians lie when they speak about their  relations and attitudes to
establishment and president Putin (Levada-tsentr, 2018c, pp. 43–44). Thus, the change of
preference falsification cannot be ruled out decisively.
Another methodological limitation in my model is about causality. Since I am utilizing
cross-sectional data in my model, it is not possible to truly point out causal relationship
between political trust and socio-demographic factors and subjective perceptions of
political and economic performance. Establishing some causality between dependent
variable (political trust) and independent variables (socialization, political performance
and economic performance domains) would require the use of longitudinal data.
The final methodological limitation relates to the data collection method. The information
drawn from the LiTS III  is  based on participant’s subjective self-reports.  The LiTS III
does not employ registered data or governmental documents in order to get the most
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accurate information about e.g. participant’s household, age or personal income. On the
other hand, while this limitation can affect the validity and reliability of some variables
(e.g. educational level, age or income), most of the variables deal with such subjective
measures as attitudes and values, and thus they could not even be drawn from the
governmental  registers  or  comparable  documents.  Moreover,  it  is  important  to  bear  in
mind that informality is widespread in Russian society (see e.g. Ledeneva, 2006). Rosstat
(Russia’s Federal Service for State Statistics), for instance, estimated that in 2018
approximately 20% of the Russian workforce was employed informally (RBK, 2019).
Extensive informal sector, in turn, naturally questions the reliability and validity of
register-based data, since large amount of information is hidden in informal sector and
networks. Thus, although registered data or governmental documents could in theory
offer more reliable data, there are also notable practical limitations related to this kind of
data in the case of Russia.
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7 Conclusions
As discussed in the introduction chapter of the thesis, the aim of this thesis was to examine
whether or not Mishler and Rose’s (2001, 2005) argument about the performance oriented
nature of political trust applies in contemporary Russia. I have considered how socio-
demographic background, and subjective perceptions of political and economic situation
affect political trust and interpersonal trust. This was done by utilizing analytical model
of Mishler and Rose (2001), and by situating the concept of trust in the context of modern
Russia. In this final chapter, I will discuss the results of that inquiry by answering the
research questions introduced in the beginning of the thesis. Finally, I will present some
thoughts on further research work on the subject.
7.1 Answering the research questions
The main research question of the thesis was whether Mishler and Rose’s (2001)
hypothesis about political trust as a response to institutional performance holds up in
today’s Russia. This hypothesis was tested by adopting the analytical model of Mishler
and Rose, and by using more recent survey data. A model consisting of altogether eight
regression analyses was applied in order to gain better understanding of which subjective
social background factors and political and economic performance perceptions have the
strongest correlations with political trust in Russia.
Regression analyses revealed that the factors associated significantly with higher political
trust were: religious group, perceived democratic freedoms, macro-economic situation,
household economy and income percentile. Political performance perceptions domain
was  clearly  the  strongest  predictor  of  political  trust  in  the  thesis’  model  with  the  total
adjusted correlation coefficient of 28.5%. Economic perceptions domain explained 19.3%
and socio-demographic domain 1.2% of the total variance of political trust in Russia,
when all the domains and independent variables were controlled. Interpersonal trust was
used as a reference category to examine the explanatory power of institutional and cultural
theories. Economic performance perceptions domain was the strongest predictor of
interpersonal with the total adjusted correlation coefficient of 9.2%, and political
performance and socio-demographic factors, respectively, explained 7.1% and 0.6% of
the total variance of interpersonal trust. Figure 5 provides the main results of the thesis’
model.
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Figure 5: Relationship between the thesis’ model domains and trust
Overall, this study strengthens the idea that political and economic performance
perceptions have far more significant importance on political trust than the socialization
and social background factors. However, Mishler and Rose’s rational response approach
to political trust sits uneasily alongside the observation that many political rights
decreased and economic situation worsened in Russia during the surveying period of the
LiTS III. As discussed in the previous chapter of the thesis, the correlations between more
positive evaluations of political and economic performance and higher levels of political
trust in Russia may also reflect impressions and heuristics related to political trust, instead
of rational evaluative responses to political performance of the analyzed institutions. In
short, political trust seems to represent responses to political and economic performance,
but the accuracy and rationality of these individual evaluations is questionable in the light
of more objective data and recent research on Russian society. This, in turn, gives cautious
support to the notion that the average citizen does not know much about politics (see e.g.
Sniderman et al. 1991, pp. 18–19).
The first sub-question, in turn, was about the commensurability of survey questions about
political trust in Russia and in democratic countries. Although it is hard – if not impossible
– to give a conclusive answer to this question, I problematized this question in the
conceptualization chapter by considering some linguistic, cultural and sociological
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understandings of Russian trust. This brief review of the subject suggests that it is
reasonable to assume that survey questions about political trust measure more or less the
same  thing  in  Russia  as  in  established  democracies.  As  mentioned  in  the
conceptualization chapter, the linguistic definitions of the Russian word for trust
(doveriye) do not support the hypothesis on highly distinctive understandings of political
trust.
Moreover, political trust seems to reflect evaluative position toward the authorities even
if one examines the question from the sociological perspective. Albeit Russians trust
mainly abstract, personalized and undemocratic institutions – such as military forces,
president and Russian Orthodox Church – it seems to be shooting rather wide off the mark
to claim the composition of political trust to be very stable and unreactive in Russia, as
some sociologists maintain (see e.g. Gudkov 2012). For example, the longitudinal polling
data indicates that political trust has fluctuated significantly over the past few decades,
and even those polling agencies with close ties with the Kremlin have reported on this.
Figure 6 presents VTsIOM’s (2019a) data on V. Putin’s trust ratings in 2007–2018.
Figure 6: Fluctuation in V. Putin’s trust ratings in 2007–2018
Such ratings are especially illustrative, since there are grounds to doubt that they are
especially susceptible to social desirability bias or preference falsification (see e.g. Frye
et al., 2017; Rogov, 2017). As one can see from the figure, even trust in Putin has
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fluctuated significantly in accordance with the political events in Russia. For instance, the
annexation of the Crimean peninsula caused a vigorous rally-around-the-flag effect in
2014, but Putin’s trust ratings started to decline again after 2015. In 2018, trust in Putin
declined dramatically from almost 60% to 35% after Prime Minister D. Medvedev
introduced the extremely unpopular pension reform, which Putin also supported (RBK,
2018).
Thus, although political trust in Russia seems to have some features of stable and solid
“totalitarian trust” described by Gudkov (2012), it seems that the dynamics of political
trust may change rapidly if certain political thresholds are crossed. Therefore, the
fluctuation of the Russian political trust indicates that it presents evaluative political
attitudes toward institutions, but the level of rationality of these evaluations is unclear and
questionable. Thus, the “doverjaj, no proverjaj” (trust but verify) –hypothesis, which was
introduced in the beginning of the thesis, cannot be confirmed. Nevertheless, the results
from the statistical models and other observations discussed in the thesis suggest that
political trust is a viable concept to be used in analyzing public support for political
institutions and societal attitudes in general in Russia.
The second sub-question was about the usability of general grand theories of trust in
analyzing political trust in Russia. In the USSR, the development of sociological surveys
lagged behind the West for the reasons discussed briefly in the conceptualization chapter.
The authoritarian polling environment skewed public opinion statistics in the ruling
power’s favor and engaged Soviet citizens in preference falsification (Kuran, 1997),
Consequently, many seminal studies on trust were developed in democratic countries,
where societal barriers for social sciences and conducting sociological surveys were
lower. However, many classic theories on trust start from the premise that  the analyzed
society is democratic (e.g. Hetherington, 1998; Putnam, 1993). If such theories are
applied without situating them to different cultural settings, the meaningfulness of the
results of these kind of studies might become questionable. To give an example, it would
be bizarre to test Putnam’s (1993) hypothesis about the relationship between social capital
and civil society as it is in the Russian context, because the organizations of civil society
have very different meaning and significance in Italy, where Putnam conducted his own
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research. In other words, it is important to acknowledge the contextual differences when
such grand theories are applied to different societal contexts.
In a certain way, the strength of Mishler and Rose’s (2001) analytical model lies in its
simplicity and generality, because their model does not make very strong assumptions
about the possible correlates of political trust. Yet, one of the challenges in interpreting
the results is the possibility of different understandings of democracy and economic
priorities between Russians and citizens of the established democratic market economies.
In recent years, the official Russia has been increasingly stressing the idea that Russian
values differ fundamentally from Western, and thus the political and economic ideals of
the democratic countries are alien to Russian “character” or “mentality” (Grigori Yudin,
2018). This line of thinking is advocated especially by some influential persons close to
the  Kremlin  and  by  some classic  Russian  novelists,  such  as  F.  Dostoevskij  (Williams,
1970). V. Surkov (2019), for instance, writes:
“There is a deep nation (in Russia). […] The deep nation is always as cagey
as can be, unreachable for sociological surveys, agitation, threats or any
other form of direct influence. […] The multilayered political institutions
which Russia has adopted from the West are sometimes seen as partly
ritualistic and established for the sake of looking ‘like everyone else’, so that
the peculiarities of our political culture wouldn’t draw too much attention
from our neighbors, irritate or frighten them. They are like a Sunday suit, put
on when visiting others, while at home we dress as we do at home. [...] In
essence, society only trusts the head of state. Whether this has something to
do with the pride of an unconquered people, or the desire to directly access
the truth, or anything else, is hard to say, but it is a fact, and it is not a new
fact. […] The contemporary model of the Russian state starts with trust and
relies on trust. This it its main distinction from the Western model, which
cultivates mistrust and criticism. And this is the source of its power.”
(emphases added)
Nevertheless, although Russia’s societal system differs from the systems of the
established Western democracies, it has many features that are typical of countries at a
similar level of economic development. As A. Shleifer and D. Treisman (2004, pp. 21–
22) present, Russia’s socio-economic profile is close to an average “normal country” in a
global scale. Typical characteristics of such “normal country” include, inter alia,
corrupted government, politicized judiciaries, unfree press, high income inequality,
concentrated corporate ownership, and turbulent macro-economic performance. Shleifer
and Treisman (ibid.) present that generally speaking the only features that differ Russia
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from  the  rest  of  its  peer  countries  are  Russia’s  nuclear  arms,  and  its  pivotal  role  in
international affairs.
To a certain extent, Shleifer and Treisman’s (ibid.) “normal country” logic seems to apply
also to political trust. As mentioned in the very beginning of the thesis, political trust is
much lower in Eastern and Southern Europe than in Northern Europe, and at the same,
Northern European countries dominate many other welfare and development rankings
too. Furthermore, extremely high figures of political trust in country’s leader or
government are not atypical for authoritarian countries. Like K. Rogov (2017, p. 4)
reminds, the rulers of such countries as Azerbaijan, China and Vietnam enjoy similar or
even higher approval ratings than Putin.
Moreover, the closer investigation into public opinion data on Russian values and
attitudes does not give firm grounds for “Surkovian” approach; as illustrated in the
previous chapter, a vast majority of Russians considers democratic institutions and
freedoms important for their country. According to these data, we can infer that although
political trust may have some distinctive features in Russia, generally speaking trust
seems to be a feeling that all human beings share, and Russians make no exception here.
This observation gives cautious support for the use of general grand theories of trust; one
simply needs to acknowledge the plausible limitations of the used data, as always when
doing research.
7.2 Thoughts about future research
It is obvious that this thesis has merely scratched the surface of the phenomenon of
political trust in Russia. There are still many unanswered questions about the mechanisms
of Russian political trust. The most important limitation lies in the fact that the analytical
model of the thesis utilized cross-sectional data, and hence it is not possible to truly prove
the causality between dependent variable (political trust) and independent variables
(socio-demographic background, and political and economic performance perceptions).
Thus, one natural progression to this work is to analyze the phenomenon using
longitudinal data.
The present thesis also set out to examine the possible distinctiveness of Russian political
trust, which was done by contextualizing and situating the concept. The insights gained
from this contextualization may be of assistance to contribute the debate on whether trust
54
is mainly universal or cultural/context dependent concept (see e.g. Levada, 2004; Watier
& Marková, 2004). As mentioned earlier, linguistic definitions of the Russian word for
trust and the data on fluctuation of political trust in Russia do not support the idea of
fundamental differences in understandings of trust between Russia and democratic
societies. Taken together, these observations suggest that one can assume the survey
questions on political trust in Russia to measure tolerably well the subject matter without
systematic biases.
Moreover, analyses done with other data from different societies would be important to
gain a better understanding of how universal the factors affecting political trust are.
Accordingly, since the possible differences in societal values between democratic and
authoritarian countries have been discussed in this thesis, the question raises if the
authoritarian attitudes could explain political trust in such non-democratic countries as
Russia. The thesis’ model presents that the perceived democratic rights and freedoms
correlate with higher levels of political trust, but tells nothing about the correlation
between  authoritarian  attitudes  and  political  trust.  At  least  the  ESS  and  WVS  include
items dealing with authoritarian attitudes, so there are already existing data on the subject.
At the same time, this research on the relationship between authoritarian attitudes and
political  trust  would  not  have  to  be  limited  only  to  Russia.  For  instance,  other  former
Soviet countries could establish an interesting comparative research setting for studying
the phenomenon.
Studying heuristics related to Russian political trust could form another interesting line
for  future  research.  As  presented  in  the  limitations  chapter  of  the  thesis,  human’s
cognitive limitations are somewhat well-documented, and thus it would be interesting to
examine what kind heuristics are related to political trust in Russia, and how these
heuristics develop.
Albeit the present thesis has not gave an exhaustive answer to the question of the origins
Russian political trust, it is hoped that it has brought some new ideas and insights in
analyzing the problem of political trust in the Russian context. Since all kind of regimes
are to some extent dependent on political support, political trust will be a crucial factor in
keeping both democratic and authoritarian societies together in the future too. Therefore,
more comprehensive understanding of political trust will be needed, and this
understanding may be gained only by doing further research on the subject.
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Appendices
Coding of the LiTS III variables used
Variable Variable in theLiTS III Question wording Scale
Trust in
political
institutions
4.04 a–g
(mean score of trust in
seven institutions)
“To what extent do you trust the
following institutions?”
parliament / regional government /
local government / political parties /
government / courts / the Presidency
1 Complete
distrust –
5 Complete
trust
Trust in people 4.05 c “To what extent do you trust people
you meet for the first time?”
1 Complete
distrust –
5 Complete
trust
Education level 1.09 ”What is the highest education level
that you (primary respondent) have
completed?”
0 = Non-tertiary
education or
lower (60.5%) –
1 = Tertiary
education or
higher (39.5%)
Age 1.05 Age in years according to the last
birthday.
min 18,
max 93,
mean 46
Gender 1.03 “Is primary respondent male or
female?”
0 = male
(45.2%)
1= female
(54.8%)
Urbanity status Contact sheet – 0 = Rural
(24.9%) –
1 = Urban
(75.1%)
Religion 9.22 “What is your religion?” 0 = Other
(14.2%) –
1 = Orthodox
Christian
(84.3%)
News
consumption
9.04 b “People use different sources to learn
what is going on in their country and
the world. For each of the following
sources, please indicate how you use
it:”
news broadcasts on radio or TV
1 Never –
7 Daily.
Perceived
corruption
4.01 i “There is less corruption than around
4 years ago.”
1 Strongly
disagree –
5 Strongly
agree.
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Perceived
freedoms
4.15 a–h
(mean score of
individual perceptions
of existing freedoms
and rights in Russia)
“To what extent do you agree that the
following exist in Russia?”
free and fair elections / law and order /
freedom of speech / peace and stability
/ a press that is independent from
government / a stong political
opposition / a courts system that threats
all citizens equally / equal rights for
women as citizens’
1 Strongly
disagree –
5 Strongly
agree.
Perceived
influence
4.01 f “Children who are born now will have
a better life than my generation.
1 Strongly
disagree –
5 Strongly
agree.
Current macro-
economic
evaluation
4.01 g “On the whole, I am satisfied with the
present state of the economy.”
1 Strongly
disagree –
5 Strongly
agree.
Current
household
economy
4.01 k “All things considered, I am satisfied
with my financial situation as a
whole.”
1 Strongly
disagree –
5 Strongly
agree.
Retrospective
household
economy
4.01 d “My household lives better than
around 4 years ago.”
1 Strongly
disagree –
5 Strongly
agree.
Income
percentile
3.15 “Please imagine a ten-step ladder
where on the bottom, the first step,
stand the poorest 10% people in our
country, and the highest step, the tenth,
stand the richest 10% in our country.
On which step of the ten is your
household today?”
1 –
10
